1. The unsuccessful landlord under the Tamil Nadu Act (18 of 1960) (hereinafter referred to as the Act), is the petitioner in this revision. The respondent herein, is the tenant under the Act. Eviction of the tenant was sought by the landlord under S. 10(3)(b) of the Act in H. R. C. No. 583 of 1970, on the file of the VI Judge, Small Cause Court, Madras (Rent controller). On contest, the Rent Controller allowed the application and ordered eviction. It must be pointed and ordered eviction. It must be pointed out that the landlord filed similar petitions against other tenants also and all the petitions were considered and disposed of by the Rent Controller by a common order dated 21-11-1972. The tenant herein and as well as the other tenants filed appeals before the appellate authority, under the Act, viz, IV Judge, Court of Small Causes, Madras, who heard and disposed of all the appeals by a common judgment dated 26-4-1973. The appellate authority mooted out the following points for consideration-
1. Have there been proper and valid notices of termination of tenancy to the appellants-tenants before the institution of these petitions?
2. Are these petitions maintainable as farmed under S. 10(3)(b) of the Act, without invoking Ss. 14(1)(a) and 14(1)(b) of the Act ?
3. Is the requirement of the petitioner trust bona fide ?
4. Are the present petitions barred under S. 19 of the Act, in view of the decision of the prior proceedings between these parties ?
2. The first point has lost significance in view of the pronouncement of this court, on this question. On the third point, the appellate authority found that the requirements of the landlord is bona fide. Equally so on the fourth point with reference to the bar under Section 19 of the Act pleaded by the tenants, the appellate authority found the point against the tenants. However, on the second point, as to whether the petition as framed under S. 10(3)(b) of the Act without invoking Ss. 14(1)(a) and 14(1)(b) is maintainable, the appellate authority came to the conclusion that the petition by the landlord is not maintainable, because in his view that it would be a case which will come under Ss. 14(1)(a) and 14(1)(b) of the Act and when such is the case, there is no justification for the landlord to seek remedies under S. 10(3)(b) of the Act. In this view, the appellate authority allowed the appeals and dismissed the petitions for eviction preferred by the landlord. This revision is directed against the orders of the appellate authority in H. R. A. No. 735 of 1972.
3. Sri T. S. Nagaswami Iyer, learned counsel for the petitioner, submits that the appellate authority has gone beyond the scope of the enquiry under S. 10(3)(b) of the Act and has taken into consideration, factors which are wholly irrelevant for a decision of the case under S. 10(3)(b) of the Act.
4. For the purpose of considering the question involved, it would be pertinent to extract the provisions of S. 10(3)(b) of the Act.
"Where the landlord of a building whether residential or non-residential, is a religious, charitable. Educational or other public institution, it may, if the building is required for the purposes of the institution, apply to the controller, subject to the provisions of cl. (A), for an order directing the tenant to put the institution in possession of the building."
5. The expressions used are that the religious, charitable, educational or other public institution must require the building for the purposes of the institution; and if it so requires, it can seek the aid of S. 10(3)(b) of the Act. In the present case, there is no dispute as evidence by the trust deed, Ex. P. 1, about the purpose for which the landlord trust should function and how it should utilise the funds and the income that could be derived from the property concerned. The trust deed sets out the same in the relevant clauses incorporated in the document, Ex. P.1. The maximum benefit or the income that could be derived from the property is the concern of the trust and to facilitate the same, a clause is also provided that the properties can be converted into a choultry for being given to vegetarian Hindus for celebration of marriages and other auspicious functions. It is with this object and to serve this purpose, the landlord sought the eviction of the tenant.
6. Sri Mardia, learned counsel appearing for the respondent, contends that it has been brought out in evidence that what the landlord wants to do is to demolish the construction and put up a new construction which alone will satisfy the requirements of the landlord in the sense, then only a Kalyana Mandapam can be put up and which can be utilised for the purposes adumbrated in Ex P. 1 the trust deed. The learned counsel for the respondent, further submits that when the material on record, discloses that the relief could be granted only under S. 14 of the Act. It is not competent for the landlord to seek the provisions of the Act under S. 10(3)(b) of the Act.
7. I do not find any substance in this contention put forth by the learned counsel for the respondent. If we remember that the objects and purposes of the trust have got to be served by the trustees who are the landlords, it is competent for them to achieve the object and serve the purposes of the Trust in any manner whatsoever they like within the powers given to them and if they require the building in question for the purpose of the Trust, it is not an answer to their claims to say that they must seek only demolition and reconstruction under S. 14(1)(b) of the Act or seek for eviction on the ground of repairs under S. 14(1)(a) of the Act. The object and purpose of the provisions of the Act do not permit such compartmentalism and that would stultify the very object of incorporating S. 10(3)(b) in the Act. S. 10(3)(b) of the Act is the specific provision, which enables a religious, charitable, educational or other public institution to seek eviction of the tenant, on the ground that the building is required for the purposes of the institution. S. 14 of the Act is a general provision which enables the 'landlord' to seek eviction on the ground of repairs or demolition and reconstruction. May be the purposes of the institution may ultimately get served, in some cases, by demolition and reconstruction of the building or carrying out the necessary repairs. The test is as to whether the institution requires the building for its purposes. Once it is found that the building is required for the purposes of the institution, the fact that the purposes could be better served by ultimately demolishing and reconstructing the building or by carrying out extensive or requisite repairs thereof, as the facts and circumstances may warrant, will not take the case out of S. 10(3)(b) of the Act.
8. In my view, the appellate authority has not properly appreciated the question involved and has taken into consideration factors which are not relevant for a decision on the question in issue. I find that the orders of the appellate authority suffer an illegality and an impropriety and in this view, I am inclined to allow this revision. Accordingly, this revision is allowed. The order of the appellate authority is set aside and that of the Rent Controller is restored. Time for eviction is six months. The learned counsel for the petitioner has no objection for the grant of such a time. There will be no order as to costs in this revision.
9. Revision allowed.