S. Mohan, J.
1. This revision illustrates how recalcitrant the tenant could be. An order of exemption was passed in G.O. Ms. No. 3397, dated 25th September, 1969 on the application of one Thirumathi V. Alamelu Ammal in respect of the premises No. 8, Prasanna Vinayagar Koil Street, Mylapore forming subject-matter of the present revision from the operation of the provisions of Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act (XVIII of 1960). Thereupon O.S. No. 7619 of 1974 was filed before the City Civil Court (6th Assistant Judge) Madras for recovery of possession. Pending suit the landlady (V. Alamelu Ammal) died on 12th March, 1975. Thereafter, I.A. No. 7249 of 1975 was taken out to bring on record petitioners 1 to 6, viz., the husband and other relations as legal representatives. It was contended on behalf of the revision petitioner that the exemption was granted in favour of the deceased-plaintiff (V. Alamelu Ammal) and therefore the cause of action did not survive to enable the legal representatives to come on record and therefore the application was liable to be dismissed. The learned 6th Assistant Judge did not agree with this contention and therefore allowed the application. It is to revise that order the present revision has been preferred.
2. Mr. K.G. Manickavasagam very strenuously contends before me that the exemption was granted in favour of Thirumathi V. Alamelu Ammal who was the sole plaintiff in the suit O.S. No. 7619 of 1974 and therefore there was no possibility of the legal representatives coming on record. In support of his submission, the Learned Counsel relies on Phool Rani v. Naubat Rai : 3SCR679 and Hajee Abdulla Sait v. K.D. Moorjani (1975) 88 L.W. 559. In the first of the decisions cited the question related to the maintainability of the petition before the Rent Control Court wherein the original landlord sought eviction of the tenant on the ground of personal occupation for himself and members of his family. In deciding that question it was laid down that the cause of action being personal viz., bona fide need of the landlord the legal representatives cannot seek eviction in that petition and therefore the cause of action did not survive. This case has absolutely no application to the facts of the present case and therefore is clearly distinguishable. The order of exemption as noted above has nothing to do with the individual. In other words, it is not personal to the grantee. However. Mr. Manickavasagam, Learned Counsel for the petitioner would contend that a reading of the entire order would clearly show that what operated in the mind of the Government was only a personal relief for the erstwhile landlady (V. Alamelu Ammal). In my view this is not the correct reading of the order. In the petition for exemption itself what the landlady put forward was that she purchased the premises in question solely with the idea of making it available for the occupation of her daughters and grandchildren who were studying in the Rosary Matriculation School, Mylapore, very near to the premises but is unable to doso since the tenant had refused to vacate and that she has no remedy under the provisions of the Act to evict him.
3. In the operative portion of the order granting exemption it is also stated 'If the exemption applied for by the landlady is not granted her daughters may have to continue to live in a cramped quarters and her grandchildren put to the difficulty of going to the school at Santhome, Mylapore from Royapettah.' Apart from there being nothing to suggest that the exemption is personal to the grantee, the operative portion noted above would clearly show throughout the stress was to house, the married daughters and the grand children. Therefore, even looked at from that point of view, the argument that it was personal to the grantee cannot be coutenanced.
4. Hajee Abdulla Salt v. K.D. Moorjani (1975) 88 L.W. 559, will also be of no assistance to the revision petitioner in the view I have just now indicated.
5. Finally it is argued on behalf of the revision petitioner that the question who are the proper legal representatives could be left open to be agitated by the revision petitioner. I find it rather difficult to follow this argument. Admittedly, the persons who are the legal representatives and who want to have the benefit of the order of exemption are seeking to come on record. If that be so, it is not open to the tenant to say who are the legal representatives and who are not. In a way, he should be thankful because if the suit were to be dismissed it will be binding upon all persons who have voluntarily chosen to come on record as legal representatives of the erstwhile landlady (V. Alamelu Ammal). Thus, I am unable to see any merit in this revision. Consequently it will stand dismissed. However, there will be no order as to costs.
6. Inasmuch as the order of exemption is, dated 25th September, 1969 the benefit of it had not been had by the respondents herein. I think it is a fit case wherein I should give direction for the expeditious disposal of the suit itself. Accordingly it is directed that the learned 6th Assistant Judge, City Civil Court will dispose of the suit before summer recess.