Skip to content


S.N. Rangaswamy Vs. S. Muthurama Reddy - Court Judgment

LegalCrystal Citation
SubjectTenancy
CourtChennai High Court
Decided On
Reported in(1982)2MLJ122
AppellantS.N. Rangaswamy
RespondentS. Muthurama Reddy
Excerpt:
- - chengalvarayan, learned counsel for the revision-petitioner, in his interesting argument, has inter alia, submitted that as the institution of the suit by the landlord was one for the arrears, but not resorting to the provisions of the special enactment, viz......appellate authority under the provisions of section 25 of the tamil nadu buildings (lease and rent control) act (xviii of 1960), as amended by act xxiii of 1973. an argument had been advanced on behalf of the tenant-revision petitioner herein that when once a suit had been filed for arrears of rent commencing from september, 1974 to october, 1976, i.e., for a period of two years and two months by the landlord by way of s.c.s. no. 4657 of 1976, which was decreed on 21st april, 1977, a petition on the ground of default of rent under the provisions of the rent control act for a period though different, commencing from november, 1976 to august, 1978, cannot be entertained, and as a matter of fact, held by the learned rent controller and the appellate authority as one for a period for.....
Judgment:

S. Swamikkannu, J.

1. This is a petition by the tenant questioning the order of the learned appellate authority under the provisions of Section 25 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act (XVIII of 1960), as amended by Act XXIII of 1973. An argument had been advanced on behalf of the tenant-revision petitioner herein that when once a suit had been filed for arrears of rent commencing from September, 1974 to October, 1976, i.e., for a period of two years and two months by the landlord by way of S.C.S. No. 4657 of 1976, which was decreed on 21st April, 1977, a petition on the ground of default of rent under the provisions of the Rent Control Act for a period though different, commencing from November, 1976 to August, 1978, cannot be entertained, and as a matter of fact, held by the learned Rent Controller and the appellate Authority as one for a period for which there had been commission of wilful default in payment of rent. Mr. Chengalvarayan, learned Counsel for the revision-petitioner, in his interesting argument, has inter alia, submitted that as the institution of the suit by the landlord was one for the arrears, but not resorting to the provisions of the Special enactment, viz., the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act (XVIII of 1960) have to be taken in view while considering the defaulted period allowed, viz., from the month of November, 1976 to August, 1978. The very fact, that the landlord had not resorted to the relevant provisions of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act for the, period commencing from September, 1974 to October, 1976, will show that there was no animus on the part of the landlord to evict the tenant-revision petitioner herein but it was only for the purpose of recovering the arrears of rent that originally the landlord had initiated legal proceedings. The learned Counsel for the revision-petitioner, Mr. Chengalvarayan, further submits that when the approach at the first instance will indicate that the further default that had been committed, even if a conclusion is to be arrived at in that direction, will not clothe that default with the characteristic of a wilful defeault; the phrase 'wilful default' contemplated by the special enactment requires some more elements to be present so as to make the revision petitioner herein liable for eviction.

2. The above contention is resisted by the other side, viz., the landlord-respondent herein and learned Counsel appearing for the respondent, submits that the institution of a suit for recovery of arrears of rent by the landlord does not absolve him from filing a petition under the provisions of the Rent Control Act alleging that the default that had been committed for the entirely different period comes within the purview of the phrase 'wilful default'. The contention raised on behalf of the revision petitioner cannot be sustained and cannot be held to be tenable. On the other hand, no proposition of law can be laid that when once the landlord had resorted to the institution of a suit in a civil Court will absolve him for alleging that a wilful default has been committed by his tenant by instituting a petition under the provisions of the special enactment. Under these circumstances, this Court finds no merit in the civil revision petition. The civil revision petition is dismissed. There is no order as to costs. Two months time is granted to the tenant to vacate the premises.


Save Judgments// Add Notes // Store Search Result sets // Organizer Client Files //