V. Balasubrahmanyan, J.
1. The petitioner before me is the tenant of a building from which he was ordered to be evicted by an order of the Rent Controller. This order has been sustained in appeal and thereafter in revision by this Court. The landlord sought to execute the order of eviction) by filing an execution petition before that Rent Controller under Section 18(2) of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960, (hereinafter referred to as the Rent Control Act). The execution petition was opposed by the tenat on the score that the order of eviction itself was nullity. The contention was based on the nature of the lease. According to the tenant, he was inducted into the tenancy of the building under a registered lease deed, dated 14th June, 1967, under which he was to be a lessee in possession for a fixed term of 21 years. The contention was that in respect of a lease for a term of years there cannot be any proceedings for termination of the tenancy or eviction of the tenant in mid-term. The Rent Controller rejected these contentions and proceeded with the execution.
2. The revision has been filed by the tenant treating the order of the Rent Controller, in execution as an order passed under Section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure. When the revision was taken up for hearing, learned Counsel for the respondent-landlord raised a preliminary objection. He urged that under Section 18(2) of the Rent Control Act, against any order passed by the Rent Controller in execution of an order of eviction, no appeal and no revision lies. I think, I must sustain this preliminary objection.
3. Section 18(1) provides that an order, of eviction shall be executed by the Controller as if such order is an order of a civil Court. The same provision enacts that for the purpose of execution of the eviction order the Rent Controller shall have all the powers of a civil Court. Having provided for the procedure for execution in the manner aforesaid, Section 18(2) lays down that an order passed in execution under Section 18(1) 'shall not be subject to any appeal or revision.'
4. In this case, the Rent Controller rejected the application of the tenant for declaring the eviction order a nullity. This order of the Rent Controller, in my judgment, is an order passed in execution under Section 18(1) of the Act. It follows, therefore, that under Section 18(2) of the Act, the present revision against that order is barred.
5. Learned Counsel for the tenant submitted that the bar under Section 18(2) operated only in a case where the order sought to be revised is an order 'passed in execution'. According to learned Counsel in a case where the Rent Controller declines to declare an order of eviction as a nullity, that order cannot be regarded as 'an order passed in execution', within the meaning of Section 18(2). I do not accept this contention as being based on a true construction of Section 18(2). To accept the argument of learned Counsel would lead to curious results. For, on that interpretation if the Rent Controller dismissed an execution petition, then a revision would be available whereas, if he allows an execution petition, a revision will not be available. I do not think that the bar under Section 18(2) can be made to depend on the nature of the order passed by the Rent Controller under Section 18(1) of the Act. In my opinion, every order passed by the Rent Controller while disposing of an execution petition must be regarded as 'an order passed in execution under Sub-section (1)' of Section 18.
6. Learned Counsel for the tenant referred to a decision of the Supreme Court reported in C. Mackertich v. Stewart and Co. Limited : (1972)ILLJ99SC . In that case the Supreme Court upheld the maintainability of a revision where the revision was filed by a tenant against whom execution was levied. The contention of the tenant in revision was that the eviction was a nullity. The Supreme Court upheld the maintainability of the revision, obviously under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. This case however, cannot serve as a precedent for the present case. The case before the Supreme Court arose out of a suit between a landlord and a tenant in which a decree in ejectment was passed against the tenant. At the execution stage the tenant pleaded the decree to be a nullity. When that plea was rejected by the Executing Court, he sought to file a revision to the High Court under Section 115 of the Code. It was while examining the maintainability of such a revision that the Supreme Court had rendered their decision. With respect, the decision is understandably correct, since the revision! in that case arose out of proceedings in execution of a decree in ejectment passed in an ejectment suit. Such is not the case in the present proceedings. This case is the very obverse. In any case the matter has got to be considered not under Section 115 of the Code, but wholly on an interpretation and application of Section 18 (2) of the Rent Control Act.
7. Section 18(2) happens to have been construed and applied by this Court in this very case between the same parties in connection with an earlier order in execution passed by the Rent Controller. That decision was in C.R.P. No. 1769 of 1979. In that case Venugopal, J., upheld a similar preliminary objection to the maintainability of a revision under Section 18(2) of the Rent Control Act against an order passed by the Rent Controller in execution. The learned Judge described the bar under Section 18(2) as 'an absolute prohibition' I respectfully agree this description.
8. For the reasons which I have earlier rendered, I uphold the preliminary objection put forward on behalf of the landlord-respondent and dismiss this petition. There will, however, be no order as to costs.