Skip to content


P.S. Angaiya Raja a Firm Represented by Its Partner Subramania Raja and K.S. Solaimalai Raja Vs. A.K.D. Alagaraja Huqdar of the Rajapalayam Chatram Charities, Ist Schedule Properties and ors. - Court Judgment

LegalCrystal Citation
SubjectLimitation
CourtChennai High Court
Decided On
Reported in(1976)2MLJ80
AppellantP.S. Angaiya Raja a Firm Represented by Its Partner Subramania Raja and K.S. Solaimalai Raja
RespondentA.K.D. Alagaraja Huqdar of the Rajapalayam Chatram Charities, Ist Schedule Properties and ors.
Cases ReferredVenugopalaswai Devasthanam v. Narayana Gounder C.R.P. No.
Excerpt:
- - stood provided that any application to which section 5 might be made applicable by or under any enactment for the time being in force might be admitted after the period of limitation prescribed therefor, if the applicant satisfied the court that he had sufficient cause for not making the application within such period. if section 5 bad not thus been made applicable the applicant before the court could bat have the benefit of that section of the act of 1908. but the wording of section 5 of the present limitation act of 1963 is different, in that it makes that provisions of section 5 applicable to all applications made before the court......suits for excusing the delay in filing the original petitions for applying under section 9 of the city tenants' protection act. the summons in the suits for ejectment was served on the petitioners on 26th june, 1971 and 28th june, 1971 and the suits were posted for appearance on 7th july, 1971. according to the petitioners, they were informed by their advocate that the original petition under section 9 of the city tenants' protection act had to be filed within thirty days from the date of their appearance in court. as the section required that the petition should be filed within one month after service on them of summons and not from the date of appearance in court, there was a delay of four days and two days.2. on the merits, there can be no difficulty in excusing the delay, for the.....
Judgment:
ORDER

P.S. Kailasam, J.

1. These two revision petitions arise Out of two interlocutory applications filed by the petitioners in the different suits for excusing the delay in filing the original petitions for applying under Section 9 of the City Tenants' Protection Act. The summons in the suits for ejectment was served on the petitioners on 26th June, 1971 and 28th June, 1971 and the suits were posted for appearance on 7th July, 1971. According to the petitioners, they were informed by their advocate that the original petition under Section 9 of the City Tenants' Protection Act had to be filed within thirty days from the date of their appearance in Court. As the section required that the petition should be filed within one month after service on them of summons and not from the date of appearance in Court, there was a delay of four days and two days.

2. On the merits, there can be no difficulty in excusing the delay, for the learned advocates who appeared for the petitioners have filed affidavits to the effect that they had advised their clients wrongly, and the Explanation to Section 5 of the Limitation Act provides that the fact that the applicant was misled in computing the prescribed period for filing the application will be sufficient cause within the meaning of Section 5.

3. But the objection to the petition for excusing the delay was based on the ground that Section 5 of the Limitation Act is not applicable, as the period of one month prescribed under Section 9(1) of the City Tenants' Protection Act is a condition precedent, thereby excluding the application of Section 5 of the Limitation Act.

4. Section 9(1) of the City Tenants' protection Act provides that the tenant who is entitled to compensation under Section 3 and against whom a suit in ejectment has been instituted may, within one month after the service on him of summons, apply to the Court for an order that the landlord shall be directed to sell the land for a price to be fixed by the Court. Under this section the application will have to be made within one month after the service on him of summons. Section 5 of the Limitation Act (XXXVI of 1963) provides that any application may be admitted after the prescribed period, if the applicant satisfies the Court that he had sufficient cause for not making the application within such period. The application under Section 9(1) of the City Tenants' Protection Act is before a civil Court and it is not disputed that Section 5 of the Limitation Act would be applicable to an application under Section 9(1) of the City Tenants' Protection Act, unless Section 9(1) is construed as a condition precedent. In other words, the contention of the learned Counsel for the respondents is that, as the right of the landlord is taken away, the section enabling the tenant to have resort to that provision should be strictly construed. Relying on a decision of a Full Bench of this Court relating to Section 9(1)(c) of the Provincial Insolvency Act, Mr. Padmanabhan, learned Counsel for the respondents, submitted that Section 9(1) of the City Tenant's Protection Act should be construed as meaning that, unless the application under that section was filed within one month after service on him of summons, the Court would have no jurisdiction to entertain such an application. Section 9(1)(c) of the Provincial Insolvency Act is in the following terms:

9(1) A creditor shall not be entitled to present an insolvency petition against a debtor, unless-

(a) ...

(b) ...

(c) the act of insolvency on which the petition is grounded has occurred within three months before the presentation of the petition.

Construing the language of this section, a Full Bench of this Court in Chenchuramana Reddi v. Palepu Arunachalam : (1935)69MLJ283 , held that Section 9(1)(c) of the Provincial Insolvency Act was a condition precedent to the filing of petition ; that is to say, the petitioning creditor must, on the day when he presents his petition, have in view some act of insolvency which the debtor had committed within the preceding three months; he had to see on that date, and that date only, what acts of insolvency were available to him; and he could not make use of any act of insolvency which had been committed outside the period of three months, as that had ceased to be an act of insolvency. Holding that Section 9(1)(c) did not provide a period of limitation the Court observed that the requirements under that section were in the nature of a condition precedent. It may be noted that at the time when this; decision was rendered by the Full Bench, Section 5 of the Limitation Act had not been made applicable to the Provincial Insolvency Act. The section, as it then; stood provided that any application to which Section 5 might be made applicable by or under any enactment for the time being in force might be admitted after the period of limitation prescribed therefor, if the applicant satisfied the Court that he had sufficient cause for not making the application within such period. Therefore, according to the wording of Section. 5 of the Limitation Act of 1908 it applied, only to applications to which it had been made applicable by or under any enactment. If Section 5 bad not thus been made applicable the applicant before the Court could Bat have the benefit of that section of the Act of 1908. But the wording of Section 5 of the present Limitation Act of 1963 is different, in that it makes that provisions of Section 5 applicable to all applications made before the Court. The requirement that Section 5 ought to have been made applicable by or under any enactment has been omitted in the new section. After the Limitation Act of 1963 came into force, the rule is that Section 5 will be applicable to all applications before the Court, though the petition may be opposed on the ground that Section 5 of the Limitation Act is not applicable, for the period prescribed under any particular section is in the nature of a condition precedent. In this connection it may be useful to refer to Section 29 of the Limitation Act, which provides that in an application under any special or local law the provisions contained in Sections 4 to 24 shall apply only in so for as and to-the extent to which they are not expressly excluded by such special or local law. The question therefore that would arise for consideration is whether the application of Section 5 of the Limitation Act of 1963 has been expressly excluded by the special or local law, viz., by the provisions of Section 9 of the City Tenants' Protection Act, with which we are now concerned. On a careful reading of Section 9(1) of the City Tenants' Protection Act, I am unable to construe the wording of Section 9 as imposing a condition precedent or expressly excluding the operation of Section 5 of the Limitation Act. The decision of the Full Bench Chenchuramana Reddi v. Palepu Arunachalam : (1935)69MLJ283 , cannot be of much help as the wording of Section 9(1)(c) of the Provincial Insolvency Act, is different and, as the law then stood Section 5 of the Limitation Act had not been made applicable.

5. The decisions of single Judges of this Court were cited at the Bar, in Sri Venugopalaswami Devasthanam, represented by its Executive Officer v. Narayana Gounder, represented by V. Mylswanty, Advocate, Coimbatore C.R.P. No. 2354 of 1972, arising out of an application under Section 9(1) of the City Tenant's Protection Act, it was held that Section 5 of the Limitation Act would not be applicable to an application under Section 9(1) of the City Tenants' Protection Act. While observing that admittedly there was no exclusion, under the City Tenants' Protection Act, of the application of the provisions of the Limitation Act, as contemplated under Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, the learned Judge held that Section 9(1) of the City Tenants' Protection Act prescribed a condition precedent, strict compliance of which was necessary in order to invoke the benefits flowing thereunder.

6. In a later decision in Mrs. Johari Bi v. K. Vinayagam (died) and his L. Rs C.M.A. No. 522 of 1974) N.S. Ramaswami, J., held that Section 5 of the Limitation Act was applicable to an application under Section 9(1) of the City Tenants' Protection Act. The learned Judge, after referring to the decision of the Full Bench in Chenchuramana Reddi v. Palepu Arunachalam : (1935)69MLJ283 , and the decision of the single Judge, in Sri. Venugopalaswami Devasthanam, represented by its Executive Officer v. Narayana Gounder, represented by V. Mylswamy, Advocate, Coimbatore C.R.P. No. 2354 of 1972 referred to above, expressed his opinion that he was unable to agree with the view expressed in Sri Venugopalaswami Devasthanam, represented by its Executive Officer v. Narayana Gounder, represented by V. Mylswamy, Advocate, Coimbatore C.R.P. No. 2354 of 1972 but found it unnecessary to refer the question to a Bench, as en the facts of the case before him, the petition could be maintained, as, because of the Amending Act XXIV of 1973, the application could be made within two months from the date of the publication of the amendment Act, and as the petition was filed within the time, it was maintainable.

7. The attention of the learned Judge, who decided Venugopalaswai Devasthanam v. Narayana Gounder C.R.P. No. 2354 of 1972, was not drawn to the difference in the wording of Section 9 (1)(c) of the Provincial Insolvency Act and Section 9(1) of the City Tenant's Protection Act. The decision of the Full Bench was based on the wording of Section 9(1)(c) of the Provincial Insolvency Act, which excluded any application unless it was in accordance with Section 9(1)(c) of the Provincial Insolvency Act. In this view, I agree with the learned Counsel for the petitioners that the provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act of 1963 apply to an application under Section 9(1) of the City Tenants' Protection Act. Both the civil; revision petitions are allowed, but, under the circumstances, there will be no order as to costs.


Save Judgments// Add Notes // Store Search Result sets // Organizer Client Files //