Seshagiri Aiyar, J.
1. The question raised in revision is whether the suit is cognizable by a Revenue Court or by a Civil Court. The District Munsif before whom this and a number of connected suits were tried was of opinion that the matter came within the jurisdiction of the Deputy-Collector. There was an appeal against that Mr. Nagabhushanam has preferred this civil revision petition to this Court against the appellate order. He contends that the proper tribunal is the Civil Court and not the Revenue Court.
2. One circumstance may be mentioned which, to my mind, is practically conclusive of this matter, and it is this. In the connected suits disposed of along with this by the Munsif there was a civil revision, petition to this Court, No. 853 of 1910, and others. In those petitions Mr. Justice Phillips was of opinion that the order of the District Munsif was right and that the Civil Courts had no jurisdiction. That decision was taken up in appeal to two Judges of this Court in Letters Patent Appeal and the decision of Mr. Justice Phillips was confirmed. If I interfere now, the, result of it will be that in the same batch of suits tried by the same District Munsif, one of them will have to be tried by the Revenue Court and the others by the Civil Courts. The question is whether this anomalous state of affairs is really necessary having regard to the facts of this case. Prima facie a land within the ambit of the zamindari must be deemed to be ryoti land, unless the zamindar shows that it is private land. There is no allegation in the plaint in this suit as regards the nature of the land, whether it is ryoti or private land. Nor is there any allegation that the land is zamindari laad.
3. Under these circumstances prima facie the presumntion is that this land being in an estate' and the claim being one for rent, the suit lies in the Revenue Courts.
4. Mr. Nagabhushanam's contention is that there is an ijara lease in respect of this land and other lands and that fact takes away the jurisdiction of the Revenue Courts. He has not been able to cite before me any authority for the proposition that where there is a ryoti land and the suit is for rent, the proper forum is the Civil Court and not the Revenue Court simply because the claim for rent arises out of an ijara lease. He mainly relied upon Clause 6 of Section 6 of the Madras Estates Land Act, which lays down that 'a person holding land as an ijaradar or farmer of the rent shall not, while so holding, acquire otherwise than by inheritance or devise a right of occupancy in any land comprised in the ijara or farm.'
5. I have very little hesitation in holding that this applies only to middlemen, who are a very well known class of persons and whose existence is recognized by a number of decisions in this Presidency. Where a middleman takes an ijara he does not acquire the occupancy right of a ryot. That is the class of cases contemplated by this Clause 6 of Section 6, and not cases where the ryot himself claims an ijara of his holding. Mr. Nagabhushanam drew my attention to the decision of two learned Judges of this Court in Tallapragada Subba Row v. Gopisetti Narayanaswami Naidu 20 M.L.T. 36 One of them Mr. Justice Napier seems to dissent from the view taken in the Letters Patent Appeal against the decision in the connected suits. From a perusal of that judgment it seems to me that the learned Judge there was considering the question of middlemen, not that of ryots, because he says in one portion of his judgment that the person was not a ''ryot'. That makes all the difference between the two classes of cases. As regards the question of the correctness of the decision in the Letters Patent Appeal referred to, with all deference I am unable to see how, if Mr. Justice Napier holds that the person against whom rent is claimed was not a 'ryot', the question of the correctness of the decision in the Letters Patent Appeal really arose. I am mainly influenced by this consideration, namely, that the learned Judges in the connected batch of petitions in this Court have held that it is the Revenue Courts which should try the suits: and I do not think that any object will be gained by a trial of these suits before a Civil Court. Moreover, all the questions that Mr. Nagabhushanam wants to raise, viz., question regarding the land not being a 'ryoti land,' etc.---all these questions can be gone into in the Revenue Court.
6. For these reasons I am of opinion that there is no substance in this petition.
7. The petition must be dismissed with costs.