Viswanatha Sastri, J.
1. The question in this second appeal is whether the real owner of a ryotwari holding can sue in a civil Court for a declaration that certain lands belong to him, and that a sale under the provisions of the Estates Land Act was 'fraudulent, illegal, invalid and not binding on him.' Plaintiff, who is the appellant in second appeal, alleging that he was the real owner of the lands, and that the registered holder Rangasami Naidu was only a benamidar, sued to have a rent sale, held at the instance of the first defendant, at which the second defendant became the purchaser, set aside on various grounds. The District Munsif found as a fact: (1) that the notice Ex. X did not specify the holding in respect of which the arrear was due ; and (2) that a large-number of fields and a larger extent than necessary wore sold in contravention of the provisions of Section 126 of the Estates Land Act. On these findings be held that the sale was invalid and gave the declaration asked for. The second defendant appealed and the appellate Court allowed the appeal on two grounds : (1) plaintiff, not being the ryot who was liable to pay rent on the holding, could not maintain the suit ; and (2) no suit, as contemplated by Section 112 of the Estates Land Act having been filed, the validity of the sale cannot be disputed.
2. Both the Courts have found that plaintiff had failed to get his name registered as a pattadar ; and this finding has to be accepted. But the question is whether the circumstance prevents him from impeaching the sale in a civil Court. That such a suit will lie in a civil Court at the instance of a ryot (pattadar) has been held by a Full Bench of this Court in Rajah of Ramnad v. Venkataramiyer A.I.R. 1923 Mad. 6. No case has been referred to in which it has been held that such a suit will not lie at the instance of a person who claims to be the real owner of a ryotwari holding. I am of opinion that such a suit is equally open to him.
3. The contention that Section 189 of the Estates Land Act barred the suit is sought to be supported by the ruling in Irulappan Servai v. Kaluvandan Servai  15 M.L.W. 99. In that case it is stated that: to allow a person who has not takenaction. under Section 146, to ignore a rent sale at the time it was held, and subsequently to dispute its validity in a civil suit would run counter to both these principles. Section 189 does not seem to me to allow of such a construction.' If a. ryot who has not instituted proceedings under Section 112 can come in with a suit in a civil Court, as has been held in the Full Bench case above referred to, it is difficult to see why a person in the position of plaintiff cannot be allowed to do so. The case in Irulappan Servai v. Kaluvandan Servai 15 M.L.W. 99 does not appear to have been brought to the notice of the learned Judges who decided the Full Bench case; but nevertheless it appears to me that the ground on which the decision proceeded is no longer tenable, having regard to the Pull Bench ruling.
4. I would, therefore, allow the second appeal and remand the case to the lower appellate Court for decision upon the other issues raised in the case. Appellant will get a refund of the Court-fee paid on the memorandum of appeal. Appellant will have the costs of the second appeal, and the other costs will abide and follow the result.