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Verudhunagar Municipality Vs. Thiruvadamaruthur Ekanatha Rao - Court Judgment

LegalCrystal Citation
SubjectCivil
CourtChennai
Decided On
Reported inAIR1936Mad498
AppellantVerudhunagar Municipality
RespondentThiruvadamaruthur Ekanatha Rao
Excerpt:
..............must be deemed to have been passed without jurisdiction. this is really the main contention in the present appeal and the fate of the appeal rests mainly on the decision on this point. the general principle is that when any power is conferred by statute or by rules having the force of law on any tribunal that power includes impliedly the power of doing all acts as are necessary for the exercise of the power expressly granted. even otherwise it cannot be said in my opinion, that in this case the order directing refund was not part and parcel or a necessary concomitant of the order setting aside the order of dismissal. the order for refund appears to flow naturally and directly from the order setting aside the order of dismissal in view of the circumstances of the present case. the head.....
Judgment:

Pandrang Row, J.

1. This is an appeal from the decree of the Additional Subordinate Judge of Ramnad at Madura dated 13th July 1931 allowing the appeal from the decree of the District Munsif of Sattur dated 29th January 1929 made in O.S. No. 472 of 1926, a suit by a former shroff in the Municipal office at Virudhanagar to recover a certain sum of money due to him by the Municipal Council. The amount sought to be recovered was Rs. 1,070 odd. The trial Court gave the plaintiff a decree for only Rs. 436 odd and disallowed the rest of the claim. As regards this amount there is no controversy in the present second appeal. The plaintiff appealed to the Subordinate Judge in respect of the balance which was disallowed by the trial Court and the Subordinate Judge allowed the appeal with costs. The present second appeal is by the Municipal Council and the amount to which the appeal relates is Rs. 499 with interest thereon. This sum of Rs. 499 was the sum found missing from the safe which was in charge of the plaintiff when he was shroff on 12th December 1922.

2. The plaintiff reported the fact that this sum was missing immediately to the acting Manager of the office and also to the Chairman delegate, the Chairman being absent from the town at the time. The plaintiff's case was that without any attempt being made to find out who was responsible for the loss of the money be was ordered to recoup the missing amount partly by payment in cash and partly by adjustment from his security deposit. In obedience to the order the plaintiff actually paid a certain amount in cash and the rest of the amount was made up by adjustment from his deposit. Subsequently, i.e. on 18th January 1923, the plaintiff was dismissed from his office by the Chairman on various charges. It may be mentioned in this connexion that the charges mainly related to the plaintiff's conduct with reference to the missing amount. The plaintiff appealed and on appeal the Appeal Committee consisting of the District Collector, the President of the District Board, and a Councillor other than the Chairman, constituted under Rule 8 of the Rules made by the Local Government under Sections 73 and 75, District Municipalities Act of 1920, allowed the appeal on 19th July 1923. In allowing the appeal the Committee set aside the order of dismissal passed by the Chairman and directed that the appellant before them, i.e., the plaintiff in the present suit, should be re-instated in his appointment with all back pay, and also directed that the missing amount recovered from the appellant, i.e. Rs 499 odd, should be refunded to him. It will thus be seen that the appeal relates only to the amount (of course with interest thereon) which was ordered by the Appeal Committee to be refunded to the plaintiff by the Municipal Council.

3. There can be no doubt that the Appeal Committee which made this order was duly constituted under rules framed under proper authority and their order cannot be treated as otherwise than valid and binding on the Municipal Council unless it was an order passed without jurisdiction. It is not pretended that the order, so far as it relates to the setting aside of the order of dismissal or to the plaintiff's re-instatement with back pay, is without jurisdiction. What is contended is that so far as the order directed refund of the amount referred to above, the order must be deemed to have been passed without jurisdiction. This is really the main contention in the present appeal and the fate of the appeal rests mainly on the decision on this point. The general principle is that when any power is conferred by statute or by rules having the force of law on any tribunal that power includes impliedly the power of doing all acts as are necessary for the exercise of the power expressly granted. Even otherwise it cannot be said in my opinion, that in this case the order directing refund was not part and parcel or a necessary concomitant of the order setting aside the order of dismissal. The order for refund appears to flow naturally and directly from the order setting aside the order of dismissal in view of the circumstances of the present case. The head and fount of the charges against the plaintiff was his conduct with reference to this sum which was ordered to be refunded. When the appellate tribunal found that he was not to blame at all so far as this sum of money was concerned, it must follow necessarily as a consequence from that decision that he was not really responsible to pay that amount to the Municipal Council and that the Municipal Council having recovered the money from him should refund it to him. I am therefore of opinion that the appellate tribunal had jurisdiction to make the order of refund. To hold otherwise would mean that the appellate tribunal cannot effectively exercise its power as an appellate tribunal. Just as the payment of back pay was ordered by the appellate tribunal and it is not contended that this was without jurisdiction, the appellate tribunal, directed also the refund of the money that had been wrongly recovered from the appellant before them.

4. The order of the appellate tribunal dated 19th July 1923 thus being a valid order passed with jurisdiction, effect was rightly given to it by the lower appellate Court, the suit itself having been based clearly on that order which is binding on both the plaintiff as well as the Municipal Council. The claim, being based on that order, was clearly within time, whether it is regarded as being governed by Article 62 or by Article 120, Lim. Act, and it is therefore not necessary to decide which of these two articles is applicable, no other article being suggested as governing the present claim. It follows also that as the order of the appellate tribunal dated 19th July 1923 was valid, the subsequent order passed by the appellate tribunal constituted in a different manner and which included even the Chairman whose order was appealed from has no force. That order is dated 11th June 1924 and it was passed after notice of suit was given and it purported to nullify entirely the previous order of the appellate tribunal dated 19th July 1923. This subsequent order of the appellate tribunal was rightly treated as invalid by the learned Subordinate Judge. No other point arises in this second appeal and it must follow from what I have said that it must fail; it is accordingly dismissed with costs.

(Leave to appeal is refused).


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