1. The only question for decision is whether interest ceases to run on money paid into Court for a decree holder under Order XXI, Rule 1, on the date of that payment or on the date when the decree-holder receives notice thereof.
2. The Code is not explicit on the point, and the authority relied on by the lower Appellate Court, Krishnaswami Chettyar v. Ramasawmi Chettyar 8 Ind. Cas. 763 : 35 M.P 44 : 9 M.L.T. 131 : (1911) 1 M.W.N. 89 deals with a payment under the special provisions of the Transfer of Property Act. Looking however to the terms of Order XXI, Rule 1, Code of Civil Procedure, I observe that there would be nothing to compel compliance by the judgment-debtor with Clause 2, which enjoins the giving of notice of the payment to the decree-holder, if the running of interest stopped before and independently of it. There is further no reason why the decree holder should be deprived of compensation for being kept out of his money, because the judgment-debtor chooses a particular method of paying it to him. On these grounds 1 would dismiss the appeal against appellate order with costs.
Seshagiri Aiyar, J.
3. I agree. Mr. Lakshmana Rao has raised an interesting question of law which is res Integra. After decree, the judgment-debtor paid the decree amount into Court with interest up to the date of the deposit; notice as provided by Order XXI, Rule 1(2), was given. The Court below has held that it is only from that date that the decree amount ceased to carry further interest. I think this conclusion is right. No doubt, as pointed out by the learned Vakil for the appellant the analogy of the Transfer of Property Act is not very helpful, as the Legislature has provided specially for the cessation of interest only after the service of notice. I think there is a closer analogy in Order XXIV of the Code of Civil Procedure. Rule 3 says that interest on the deposit would case to run from the date of the notice to the defendant. That is to say that the deposit being taken to have been made up correctly to the date of the deposit, the liability for interest on the sum which, by the fact of the payment, the defendant acknowledges to be due to the plaintiff, ceases when the latter has notice of it and is put in the way of receiving the money from Court. True, that the order in question in terms only governs payments in the course of the hearing of a suit. I do not see why the same principle should not be applied to payments in the course of execution proceedings, especially as Order XXI, Rule (1)(a), does not say that by the payment satisfaction of the claim of the decree-holder is ipso facto to be entered. The provision for notice rather indicates that the decree-holder's right should be affected only after he is informed that the decree amount is available for him and that he can draw it out of Court. For these reasons I agree that the appeal should be dismissed.