1. This is a petition to revise the order of the Subordinate Judge of Tanjore confirming the order of the Rent Controller, Tanjore, evicting the petitioner. By Section 12(1)(a) of the Madras Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1946, ' the Provincial Government may, by general or special order notified in the Fort St. George Gazette, confer on such officers and authorities as they think fit, the powers of appellate authorities for the purposes of this Act.... ' In exercise of this power the Provincial Government have appointed the District Judges in some places and Subordinate Judges in other places as ' appellate autho-rities'. In the Tanjore district the Subordinate Judge has been so appointed.
2. A preliminary point arises as to whether this Court has jurisdiction to inter-fere in revision. Clearly such jurisdiction can arise only if the case is one falling within the provisions of Section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code. The question then is whether the Subordinate Judge of Tanjore acting as an ' appellate authority ' under this Act is properly to be regarded as a Court subordinate to the High Court. Counsel for the petitioner has referred me to the following relevant authorities of this Court on this very interesting point: Abdul Sattar Sahib v. Special Deputy Collector, Vizagapatam Harbour Acquisition (1923) 46 M.L.J. 209 : I.L.R. 47 Mad. 357, Parthasarathi Naidu v. Kotiswararao (1923) 46 M.L.J. 201 : I.L.R. 47 Mad. 369 Ramaswami Goundar v. Muthuvelappa Goundar (1922) 44 M.L.J. 1 : I.L.R. 46 Mad, Lakshmana Chetti v. Kannappar (1922) 44 M.L.J. 1 : I.L.R. 46 Mad, Rajah of Venkatagiri v. Shaik Mahaboob Saheb : AIR1944Mad139 and Abdul Wahid Sahib v. Abdul Khader Sahib : AIR1947Mad400 . In view of these authorities I find it impossible to regard the Subordinate Judge of Tanjore in this matter as a Court subordinate to the High Court. Had the Subordinate Judge been appointed in the Act as the appellate authority the position might well have been different; for then there would have been an indication of intention on the part of the Legislature to give jurisdiction in such matters to an existing Court. I say ' might have been different', because even so, I am inclined to the view that the remaining provisions of Section 12 of the Act would negative any such intention, as Clause 3 of Section 12 directs that in hearing an appeal the appellate authority shall send for the records of the case from the Controller and after giving the parties an opportunity of being heard and, if necessary, after making such further inquiry 'as he thinks fit either personally or through the Controller, shall decide the appeal.' Thus the appellate authority is entitled to make enquiries himself apart from hearing the parties and to take the results of those enquiries into account in arriving at his decision. This provision is entirely inconsistent with the accepted rules which would govern a Court. Again it is noteworthy that the Act empowers the Provincial Government to confer the power of appellate authorities ' on such officers and authorities as they think fit.' There is here no indication of intention to leave these matters for consider-ation by any Civil Court. Any officer or authority could be appointed. In Abdul Wahid Sahib v. Abdul Khader Sahib : AIR1947Mad400 , my learned brother, Yahya Ali, J., has decided this same point. He came to the conclusion that the language of Section 12 makes it clear that a District Judge or Subordinate Judge notified as the appellate autho-rity is appointed as a persona designata and not as a Court, and I am in complete agreement with that conclusion.
3. Accordingly the petition is dismissed with costs. C.M.P. No. 7268 of 1947 is dismissed.