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Poongavanammal Vs. Chinnathambi Kounder - Court Judgment

LegalCrystal Citation
SubjectProperty;Civil
CourtChennai High Court
Decided On
Reported in(1981)1MLJ115
AppellantPoongavanammal
RespondentChinnathambi Kounder
Cases ReferredRaghava Reddy v. Official Assignee
Excerpt:
.....further question then remains, was the purchase made in good faith? it has been contended for the official receiver that no purchaser having knowledge of the debtor's insolvency can ever be treated as acting in good faith within the meaning of this section. for, granting that he had notice, could it be said that there was want of good faith on his part when he purchased the property as a sale sanctioned by the court? it does expressly say that a person, who in good faith purchases the property of a debtor under a sale in execution shall in all cases acquire a good title against the receiver. this was very clearly stated by their lordships of the privy council in the case of raghunath das v. these clearly are the grounds on which their lordships held the sale to be 'irregular'.the third..........district court of south arcot, cuddalore, on 30th august, 1961. the suit property was sold by the official receiver under exhibit a-1 dated 16th may, 1964, to the respondent herein and the said sale deed was registered on 11th september, 1964. in o.s. no. 446 of 1960 on the file of the court of the district munsif of villupuram, a decree was passed against the said dhandapani reddy. in execution of that decree, the suit property was brought to sale and the appellant purchased the same on 9th march, 1964, and the said sale was confirmed on 10th april, 1964, and she obtained delivery of possession of the property on 20th july, 1964. it will be seen that the court-auction-sale in the particular case took place after the adjudication of dhandapani reddy as insolvent on 30th august, 1961. it.....
Judgment:

M.M. Ismail, C.J.

1. This is an appeal against the judgment and decree of Varadarajan, J., dated 14th August, 1975, rendered in Second Appeal No. 942 of 1972.

2. One Dhandapani Reddy was adjudged insolvent in I.P. No. 4 of 1961 on the file of the District Court of South Arcot, Cuddalore, on 30th August, 1961. The suit property was sold by the Official Receiver under Exhibit A-1 dated 16th May, 1964, to the respondent herein and the said sale deed was registered on 11th September, 1964. In O.S. No. 446 of 1960 on the file of the Court of the District Munsif of Villupuram, a decree was passed against the said Dhandapani Reddy. In execution of that decree, the suit property was brought to sale and the appellant purchased the same on 9th March, 1964, and the said sale was confirmed on 10th April, 1964, and she obtained delivery of possession of the property on 20th July, 1964. It will be seen that the Court-auction-sale in the particular case took place after the adjudication of Dhandapani Reddy as insolvent on 30th August, 1961. It is in that situation, the respondent herein instituted O.S. No. 459 of 1966 on the file of the Court of the District Munsif, Villupuram for declaration of his title to the suit property and for recovery of possession with past and future profits. The claim was based on his purchase under Exhibit A-l sale deed executed by the Official Receiver, in the insolvency proceedings. According to him, the Court auction-sale having taken place subsequent to the adjudication of Dhandapani Reddy, the Court-auction-purchaser, namely the appellant herein, did not acquire any title to the property as against the Official Receiver. The point that had to be considered by the Courts below was whether Section 52(3) of the Provincial Insolvency Act, 1920, hereinafter referred to as the Act, applied to such a sale or not. Relying on the decisions of this Court, the Courts below held that the Court-auction-sale did not prevail against the Official Receiver and therefore the sale by the Official Receiver in favour of the respondent herein would prevail. It is that matter which came up to this Court in Second Appeal No. 942 of 1972. Even before this Court, the question that came to be considered was whether the Court-auctio-sale that took place subsequent to the adjudication of Dhandapani Reddy would prevail over the sale of the suit property by the Official Receiver in the insolvency proceedings in favour of the respondent herein. Relying upon the two decisions of this Court in Bachu Millikarjuna Rao v. The Official Receiver, Kistna : AIR1938Mad449 . and Karamsetti Guruvaiah v. F. Rangiah : AIR1942Mad415 . as against the decision of the other Courts, Viradarajan, J., held that Section 51(3) of Act will have no application to the sale in question, namely, the sale that took place subsequent to the adjudication, and therefore, the sale by the Official Receiver in favour of the respondent herein would prevail, with the result, the second appeal preferred by the appellant herein was dismissed. However, the learned Judge granted leave and hence the present Letters Patent Appeal.

3. The only question that arises for consideration is whether Section 51(3) of the Act applies to the present case or not. Part III of the Act includes Sections 45 to 68. It is captioned as 'Administration of Property'. Under the said heading, there are different sub-headings. One is the sub-heading, 'Effect of insolvency on antecedent transactions'. Under this sub-heading (Bachu Mallikarjuna Rao's case, K. Guruvaiah's case) only Sections 51 to 55 find places. Section 51 reads as follows:

51(1) Where execution of a decree has issued against the property of a debtor, no person shall be entitled to the benefit of the execution against the receiver except in respect of assets realised in the course of the execution by sale or otherwise before the date of admission of the petition.

(2) Nothing in this section shall affect the rights of a secured creditor in respect of the property against which the decree is executed.

(3) A person who in good faith purchases the property of a debtor under a sale in execution shall in all cases acquire a good title to it against the receiver.

Whether Sub-section (3) of this section will apply to a Court auction sale that takes place subsequent to the adjudication of the debtor as an insolvent, came to be considered by this Court in several decisions. One of the earliest decisions of this Court is in Anantharama Iyer v. Vettath Kultimalu Kovilamma : (1916)30MLJ611 . In that case, one Abdul Kadir was adjudged an insolvent on 17th August, 1911. In exe-cut on of a decree obtained against Abdul Kadir on 21st January, 1911, certain properties were attached. The Receiver of the insolvent's estate applied to the Subordinate Judge of Calicut on 2nd March, 1912 to stay the sale on the ground that Abdul Kadir had been declared an insolvent. A fresh sale proclamation was issued and the sale was adjourned to 15th April, 1912 on which date the property was sold subject to a mortgage in favour of one Ummar Sahib and was purchased by the second respondent before the High Court. On 19th April, 1912, the Receiver applied to the Court under Order 21, Rule 90 of the Code of Civil Procedure to set aside the sale. The Subordinate Judge dismissed the application on the ground inter alia, that the insolvency proceedings in the District Court related to the insolvency of a firm of which the judgment debtor was a member and that the property sold was not the property of the firm but the exclusive property of Abdul Kadir, that the auction-purchaser was a purchaser in good faith and that neither Section 47 nor Order 21, Rule 90 of the Code of Civil Procedure had any application. On appeal, the District Judge dismissed the same holding that Order 21, Rule 90 of the Code of Civil Procedure did not apply as there was no irregularity in publishing or conducting the sale. It was that matter which ultimately came up to this Court. The point that came to be considered by the Court is stated in the following contentions advanced on behalf of the appellant before the High Court.

Mr. Rosario contends (1) that after adjudication no creditor is entitled to proceed against the person or property of the insolvent, and that when it was brought to the notice of the Court by the Receiver that the judgment-debtor had been adjudged an insolvent, the Court ought not to have proceeded with the sale;

(2) that as a matter of procedure the Receiver in whom the insolvent's estate vested on the making of the adjudication order ought to have been made a party to the execution proceedings and that the sale is bad. Mr. Rosario has referred. us by way of analogy to certain cases. Ramaswomi v. Bagirathi (1888) ILR 6 Mad 180. which was followed in Krishnayya, v. Unissa Begam (1891) ILR 15 Mad 399. and Rayarappan Nambiar v. Malikandi Aketh : AIR1914Mad297(2) Mayan, where it was held that a sale held without bringing on record the legal representatives of the deceased judgment-debtor is void or a nullity as against the representative of the judgment-debtors.

The Bench proceeded to observe:

We think that the sale was altogether irregular and that the Court in holding that the sale after it had been brought to its notice that the judgment-debtor had been adjudged an insolvent, acted, if not without jurisdiction, at any rate with material irregularity in the exercise of the jurisdiction of the Court. Section 34(1) of the Provincial Insolvency Act provides that

'Where execution of a decree has issued against the property of a debtor, no person shall be entitled to the benefit of the execution against the Receiver except in respect of assets realised in the course of the execution by sale or otherwise before the date of the order of adjudication.'

The terms of the section are quite clear and we think, must be given effect to. In this case both the sale and the realisation of the assets took place after the adjudication order was made. We are also of opinion that the judgment-debtor had at the time of the sale no right, title or interest which could be sold or vested in a purchaser and that, consequently the second respondent acquired no title as to the property which had passed to the Receiver on the adjudication order being made. See Raghunath Das v. Sundar Das 22 MLJ 150 : (1914) ILR 42 Cal 72 : 41 IA 251 : 1 LW 567 : AIR 1914 PC 129. Mr. Narasimha Rao for the 2nd respondent relies on Sub-clause 3 of Section 34 of the Provincial Insolvency Act which provides that 'a person who in good faith purchases the property of a debtor under a sale in execution shall, in all cases acquire a good title to it against the Receiver.

'The corresponding provision in the present Act is Section 51(3).

It appears to us that a purchaser in good faith means a person who did not know at the time of the sale that the judgment-debtor was an insolvent, and could not by the exercise of due diligence have discovered that an adjudication order had been made. The sale in this case was stayed at the instance of the Receiver and adjourned for a month and a fresh sale proclamation was issued. It is difficult to believe that the auction-purchaser could have been unaware of the fact that the judgment-debtor whose property was sold had been declared an insolvent. The insolvency of Abdul Kadir must have been a matter of notoreity in Calicut where the property was sold and the purchaser must have been aware of it. Further, it is only the purchaser of the property of the 'debtor' who is protected but when the property had vested in the Receiver before the sale it ceased in law to be the property of the debtor and hence Section 34 has no application.

(Italics ours.)

4. The next relevant decision of this Court is Muthan Chettiar v. Venkitaswami Naicker (1936) ILR 59 Mad 928. Venkatasubba Rao, J., observed:

The question has really to be decided with reference to Section 51, which has not been referred to in that judgment. (Subramania Aiyar v. The Official Receiver, Tanjore (1925) 50 MLJ665; 23 LW 300 : AIR 1926 Mad 432. That section, after saying that an exacution--credit or is not entitled to the benefit of the execution unless the assets are realised by sale or otherwise, before the admission of the petition, goes on to say in Sub-section (3):

A person who in good faith purchases the property of a debtor under a sale in execution shall in all cases acquire a good title to it against the receiver.

5. The sale here contemplated must necessarily be that held after the admission of the petition, for, if it be a sale held previous to that, the execution--creditor would become entitled even to the sale proceeds and the property would pass to the purchaser, independent of the question of good faith. Sub-section (3) therefore means, that although by reason of the sale being held after the admission of the petition, the decree-holder gets no right to the proceeds, the purchaser in good faith nevertheless acquires a good title to the property. As a matter of construction (although this point does not now arise) it would follow that, even in regard to a sale held after the date of adjudication, a bona fide purchaser would under this sub-section be protected. This is the view taken, and in my opinion rightly, in Ramanatha v. Vijayaraghavalu : AIR1927Mad983 . The further question then remains, was the purchase made in good faith? It has been contended for the Official Receiver that no purchaser having knowledge of the debtor's insolvency can ever be treated as acting in good faith within the meaning of this section. For this position, the learned Counsel relies upon Anantharama Iyer v. Kuttimallu Kovilamma : (1916)30MLJ611 . but I must respectfully dissent from it. I think it is unnecessary to enquire whether or not the purchaser here had notice of the debtor's insolvency; for, granting that he had notice, could it be said that there was want of good faith on his part when he purchased the property as a sale sanctioned by the Court? Two things have to be noticed with reference to this decision. The first is that the statement that is made in the sentence : 'As a matter of construction (although this point does not now arise) it would follow that, even in regard to a sale held after the date of adjudication, a bona fide purchaser would under this sub-section be protected.'

On the face of it, is admittedly obiter dictum because, the learned Judge himself says 'although this point does not now arise'. Secondly, the learned Judge, has dissented from the judgment in Anantharama Iyer v. Kuttimalu Kovilamma (1916) 30 M.L.J 611 : : (1916)30MLJ611 : 3 LW 504. That being a decision of a Bench of this Court, the Bench of which Venkatasubba Rao, J., was a member, having disagreed with the earlier Bench decision, should have really referred the matter to a Full Bench and ought not to have dissented from that view leaving the subordinate judiciary without proper guidance as to which decision they should follow. It is in view of this position only subsequent decisions treated this observation of Venkatasubba Rao, J., as merely obiter dictum.

6. The question came to be considered by another Bench of this Court in Bachu Mallikarjuna Rao v. The Official Receiver, Kistna : AIR1938Mad449 . Burn, J., referred to the arguments advanced on behalf of the appellant before the Court based on Section 51(3) and the decision in Muthan Chettiar v. Venkitaswami Naicker 71 M.L.J. 170 : 44 L.W. 194 : (1936) I.L.R. 59 Mad. 928. and observed.

Now there is no doubt about the all-embracing character of the words in Section 51(3) of the Provincial Insolvency Act. It does expressly say that a person, who in good faith purchases the property of a debtor under a sale in execution shall in all cases acquire a good title against the Receiver. But it must be borne in mind that Section 51 of the Provincial Insolvency Act comes under the heading 'Effect of insolvency on attendant transactions', and although it has been pointed out by Willer, J. in Sivasami Odayar v. Subramania Aiyar 62 MLJ 68 : 34 LW 908 : (1931) ILR 55 Mad 316 : AIR 1932 Mad 95. that Section 52 in its present form is entirely out of place under that heading it has never been suggested that Section 51 is out of place. It would seem to follow that Section 51 can only govern transactions prior to insolvency, i.e., prior to adjudication. If that is so, the words, 'in all cases' in section 51(3) can only mean in all cases prior to adjudication for no part of this section can have any bearing upon transactions subsequent to adjudication. This aspect of the matter has been more fully discussed by my learned brother whose judgment I have had the advantage of reading, and with whom I am in agreement.

7. Again it must be noticed that Section 51(3) deals with purchase of the property of a debtor. Now upon adjudication, the property of an insolvent vests immediately in the Official Receiver, i.e., the property passes to the Official Receiver, and in so far as the judgment-debtor is concerned, there is no property of his which can be sold by the executing Court. This was very clearly stated by their Lordships of the Privy Council in the case of Raghunath Das v. Sundar Das Khetri 27 MLJ 150 : 1 L W 567 : 41 IA 251 : (1914) ILR 420 Cal, 72(P.C.). The Judgment of Lord Parker states that in their Lordships' opinion the sale in that case was altogether 'irregular and inoperative'. His Lordship goes on to state three grounds for this opinion:

In the first place the property having passed to the Official Assignee, it was wrong to allow the sale to proceed at all. The judgment-creditors had no charge on the land, and the Court could not properly give them such a charge at the expense of the other creditors of the insolvents. In the second place if proper steps had been taken to bring the Official Assignee before the Court and obtain an order binding on him, and accordingly he was not bound by anything which was done. In the third place the judgment-debtors had at the time of the sale no right, title or interest which could be sold to or vested in a purchaser, and consequently the respondents acquired no title to the property.

It will be seen that the first two grounds stated by Lord Parker relate to matters of procedure, viz. (i) the sale ought not have been allowed to go on and (ii) the sale should certainly not have been allowed to go on without notice to the Official Assignee. These clearly are the grounds on which their Lordships held the sale to be 'irregular'. The third ground however is a matter of substantive right. The right, title and interest of the judgment-debtor having passed to the Official Assignee there was nothing left for the Court to sell in execution. That is why their Lordships say that the sale, besides being irregular, was, 'inoperative'. Then dealing with the controversy based on the decision in Muthan Chettiar v. Venkitaswami Naicker 71 MLJ 170 : 44 LW 194 : (1936) ILR 59 Mad 928. the learned Judge proceeded to state:

8. The most recent case and the one most strongly relied upon by Mr. Satyanarayana Rao, is the case of Muthan Chettiar v. Venkitaswami Naicker 71 MLJ 170 : 44 LW 194 : (1936) ILR 59 Mad 928. That was a case of a sale held after the admission of the insolvency petition but before adjudication and it was decided that the sale was good as against the Receiver, Mr. Satyanarayana Rao relies upon certain observations made obiter by Venkatasubba Rao, J. The learned Judge considers that Section 51(3) applies to all cases, whether the sale is held before the adjudication or after the adjudication. He holds that the Privy Council case of Raghunatha Das v. Sundar Das Khetri 27 M.L.J. 150 : I.L.R. 42 Gal (P.C.). does not apply because in the Indian Insolvency Act there was no provision corresponding to Section 51(3) of the Provincial Insolvency Act. There is however no discussion by the learned Judge of what appears to me, I say it with great respect, to be the most weighty reason for the decision of their Lordships of the Privy Council, viz. that the insolvent's property having vested in the Official Receiver upon adjudication, there is nothing left which an executing Court can sell as the property of the debtor.

9. After making the above observations the Bench followed the decision of the earlier Bench in Ananthatama Iyer v. Kuttimalu Kovilamma : (1916)30MLJ611 Burn, J., went to the extent of stating:

So far as I am aware, there is no authority in this Court to the contrary and I am therefore bound to follow it. I do so with greater readiness because, with due respect, I consider it to be altogether sound.

10. In Annamlai Chettiar v. Lakshmanan Chettiar : AIR1939Mad433 . Wadsworth, J., stated:

On this question it seems that the matter is concluded by a Bench decision reported in Mallikarjuna Rao v. Official Receiver, Kistna : AIR1938Mad449 the learned Judges reading Section 51 in the light of the heading 'effect of insolvency on antecedent transactions and holding that it has no relation to transactions taking place after the adjudication. This decision dissents from an obiter dictum of Venkatasubba Rao, J. in a case reported in Muthan Chettiar v. Venkituswami Naicken 71 M.L.J. 170 : (1936) I.L.R. 59 Mad. 928. I respectfully agree with the learned Judges of the Bench that Section 51, Sub-section (3) does not apply to a purchase in execution after the adjudication which vests the property in the Official Receiver. The next decision is that in Karamsetti Guruviah v. V. Rangaiah : AIR1942Mad415 . That Bench observed:

'The decision of King, J., dismissing the Second Appeal was based on the judgment of this Court in Mallikarjuna v. Official Receiver, Kistna : AIR1938Mad449 where it Was held that Sub-section (3) of Section 51 of the Provincial Insolvency Act only applies to sales which have taken place before the order of adjudication. Learned Counsel for the appellant admits that this decision is against him, as is also the decision of another Bench of this Court, namely that given in Anantharama Aiyar v. Kuttimalu Kovilamma : (1916)30MLJ611 . He says, however that a contrary opinion was expressed by Venkatasubbarao, J. sitting with Cornish J., in Mathin Chettiar v. Venkituswami Naicken 71 M.L.J. 170 : (1936) ILR 59 Mad. 928. and in these circumstances he asks that the question be referred to a Full Bench. The judgment of Venkatasubbarao, J., in Muthan Chettiar v. Venkituswami Naicken 71 MLJ 170 : (1936) ILR 59 Mad 928. in so far as it deals with the question now under discussion, was entirely obiter, and the observations of Venkatasubba Rao, J. were fully discussed in the judgment of Burn, J. in Mallikarjuna v. Official Receiver, Kistna : AIR1938Mad449 . We see no necessity for a reference to a Full Bench, especially, as the last mentioned case is supported by the Judgment of this Court in Anantharama Aiyar, v. Kuttimalu Kooilamma : (1916)30MLJ611 .

11. The next decision is that of a Full Bench of this Court in Raghava Reddy v. Official Assignee, Madras : AIR1964Mad549 . The Full Bench in that case observed:

Divergent views have been expressed by the several High Courts on the question whether knowledge simpliciter of the pendency of insolvency proceedings on the part of such purchaser would render his purchase any the less entitled to the protection given by Section 53(3) of the Presidency Towns Insolvency Act. In D.S. Marvadi v. M.T. Shimpi I.L.R. (1969) Bom. 249 : A.I.R. 1969 Bom. 10 referring to the differing views expressed by the High Courts, Mudholkar, J. observed:

It seems to me that considering the provisions of Sub-sections (2) and (7) of Section 28 of the Provincial Insolvency Act along with the provisions of Sections 51 and 52 thereof the title of the Receiver to the property of the insolvent would relate back from the date of adjudication to the date of the petition and the auction-purchaser at the sale held in execution of the decree against the insolvent would only get a title defeasible by the Receiver unless he was a purchaser in good faith.

The conflict of views noticed in that case is no less marked between the learned Judges of this Court itself. In Anantarama Iyer v. Kuttimalu Kooilamma : (1916)30MLJ611 . it was observed that a purchaser in good faith meant a person who did not know at the time of the sale that the judgment-debtor was an insolvent, and could not, by the exercise of due diligence, have discovered that an adjudication had been made. That was a case where the Court sale was after the adjudication. The view taken in that case that the protection afforded by Section 51(3) of the Provincial Insolvency Act, corresponding to Section 53(3) of the Presidency Towns Insolvency Act will not be available to the purchaser once an adjudication, had been made, was dissented from by Venkatasubba Rao, J. ad obiter dictum in Muthan Chettiar v. Venkataswami Naicken (1936) ILR 59 Mad 928 : 71 MLJ 1 70. 'That view of Venkata Subba Rao, J. finds support in a recent Full Bench decision of the Andhra High Court in Srirangamma v. Narayanamma (1956) An WR 815 : 1956 An LI 755 : AIR 1956 AP 243.

But it has not been accepted by this Court. In Mallikarjuna Rao v. Official Receiver : AIR1938Mad449 . Burn and Mockett, JJ, accepted the decision in Anantharama Iyer v. Kuttimalu Kovilamma : (1916)30MLJ611 . In a still later case, Guruviah v. Rangaiah : AIR1942Mad415 . Leach C.J., and Kuppuswami Aiyar, J., pointed out that the dissent expressed by Venkatasubba Rao, J. in Muthan Chettiar v. Venkituswami (1936) ILR 59 Mad 928 : 71 MLJ 170. by way of obiter was incorrect and that Anantharama Iyer v. Kuttimalu Kovilamma : (1916)30MLJ611 . has been correctly decided.

The principles that emerge by reference to the above decisions are : (1) This Court has been unanimously and repeatedly holding that Section 51(3) of the Act has no application to an execution sale taking place after the adjudication. (2) The observations of Venkatasubba Rao, J., in Muthan Chettair, v. Venkitaswami Naicken (1936) ILR 59 Mad 928 : 71 MLJ 170 are only obiter dicta and even the learned Judge himself stated that the question did not arise in the case that was before the Bench. Subsequently, single Judges as well as Benches have also expressed the view that the observations of Venkatasubba Rao, J., are merely obiter dicta and the view expressed by that learned Judge was not correct. (3) Even when a Bench was requested to refer the question to a Full Bench on the ground that there is a conflict of opinion between the Judges of this Court in Anantharama Iyer v. Kuttimalu Kovilamma : (1916)30MLJ611 . and in Muthan Chettiar v. Venkitaswami Naicken (1936) ILR 59 Mad 928 : 71 MLJ 170. the Bench declined to make a reference on the ground that the observations of Venkatasubba Rao, J. in Muthan Chettiar v. Venkitaswami Naicken (1936) ILR 59 Mad 928 : 71 MLJ 170.were only obiter dicta and the said view was not correct. (4) This view of the Bench as well as the obiter dictum character of the observations of Venkatasubba Rao, J. as well as the incorrectness of that obiter dictum were affirmed by the Full Bench in Raghava Reddy v. Official Assignee, Madras (1964) 2 MLJ 168 : ILR (1961) 1 Mad 752.

12. It is against the background of this legal position, we have to consider the request of the learned Counsel, for the appellant to refer the matter to a Full Bench. The learned Counsel for the appellant contended that several of the Courts have taken a different view, such as the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Srirangamma v. Narayanamma (1956) An WR 815 : AIR 1956 AP 243. referred to by the Full Bench in Raghava Reddy v. Official Assignee, Madras (1964) 2 MLJ 168 : ILR(1964) 1 Mad 752. We are clearly of the opinion that no such course is open to us for the following reasons. In the first place, an earlier Bench of this Court declined to make a reference to the Full Bench on the ground that observations of Venkatasubba Rao, J. were only obiter dicta and those observations also were incorrect. Secondly, a Full Bench has affirmed that view and held that this Court had not accepted the view of Venkatasubba Rao, J. accepted by the Full Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Srirangamma v. Narayanamma (1956) An WR 815 : AIR 1956 AP 243. Consequently, without ourselves differing from the earlier Bench decision in Guruvaiah v. Rangaiah : AIR1942Mad415 . as well as the Full Bench decision in Raghava Reddy v. Official Assignee, Madras (1964) 2 M.L.J. 168 : I.L.R. (1964) 1 Mad. 752. We cannot make a reference to a larger Bench. We are of the opinion that having regard to this position, we have to simply follow the earlier views of this Court and hold that the execution sale in favour of the appellant which admittedly took place after the adjudication of Dhandapani Reddy as an insolvent cannot prevail and Section 51(3) of the Act will have no application to the case of the appellant herein.

13. The result is the Letters Patent Appeal fails and is dismissed. There will be no order as to costs.


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