Srinivasa Iyengar, J.
1. With regard to all items in the schedule to the plaint other than 6 and 18 the appeal is clearly not sustainable. The appellant who is the plaintiff in the lower Court instituted the suit for recovery of possession of various items on the ground that, after the death of the widow of the last male holder, he became, as the reversioner, entitled to all these properties. It has been found by the Court that a previous suit, O. S. 370 of 1889 on the file of the District Munsif's Court, Bapatla, has been instituted on behalf of this very plaintiff, when he was a minor, by his mother as next friend.
2. In that suit a compromise was entered into as the result of which it was decreed that the plaintiff should get possession immediately of some portion of the property belonging to the estate of the last male holder and that the alienations so far effected by the widow should not be liable to be called into question by the plaintiff and also further that the plaintiff would not be entitled to question any future alienations to be made by the widow. So far as the other items above referred to are concerned, it is clear that the transaction on which the decree of the Court was based was merely voidable because it is within the province of a guardian to enter into a reasonable compromise of disputes in a suit, and the decree not having been set aside within the period allowed by the law of limitation, it must be held that the plaintiff is not entitled now to any remedy with regard to these items of properties. But the case is entirely different with regard to items 6 and 18. Those items do not appear to have been alienated before the date of the compromise or the decree. Now the question is whether a minor's guardian is entitled by any contract which might otherwise be valid to bind a minor with regard to any agreement relating to what is correctly described as spes successionis. Their Lordships of the Judicial Committee in Amrit Narayan Singh v. Gaya Singh A. I. R. 1917 P. C. 95 clearly point out that no guardian of a Hindu minor has any right to seek to bind him by any contract or agreement with regard to anything which was not vested in the minor as property or right or in other words, with regard to spes successionis. At p. 603 this is what their Lordships say.
A Hindu reversioner has no right or interest in preesenti in the property which the female owner holds for her life. Until it vests in him on her death, should he survive her, he has nothing to assign or to relinquish or even to transmit to his heirs. His right becomes concrete only on her demise; until then it is mere spes successionis. His guardian, if he happens to be a minor, cannot bargain with it on his behalf or bind him by any contractual engagement in respect thereto.
3. It is clear that to hold otherwise would lead to very serious consequences. After all the extent to which a guardian might bind a minor by his acts is really limited by the extent to which the minor might be regarded as benefited by the acts of the guardian, and obviously in respect of a dealing with regard to what is neither a right nor property but mere spes successionis, it is clear that a guardian should not be regarded as having any power to enter into any binding engagement on behalf of the minor. In this case it appears that though the defendants set up alienations by the widow in respect of even items 6 and 18 such deeds of alienations have not been produced or filed in Court. How, when the defendants even fail to produce such a sale-deed, the lower Court came to hold that there was a sale, it is difficult to understand. Mr. Raghava Rao, the learned vakil for the respondents, states that there is no finding that these alienations were subsequent in date to the compromise or the decree. If so it is really necessary that the lower Court should actually find whether these were alienations effected by the female holder subsequent to the date of the compromise. If so, it would follow from what we have said already that the alienation should not be binding on the minor. Mr. Raghava Rao, raises also another point with regard to item 18. He states that, subsequent to the alienation, the purchasers, at any rate, some subsequent purchasers, have made some improvements on the property, and as they made the improvements bona fide the value of the improvements should be made good to them before any decree is passed for delivery of possession of the property in favour of the plaintiff. The circumstances under which the said improvements are alleged to have been made should also be inquired into by the lower Court and the question whether in these circumstances the plaintiff is liable to pay the value of the improvements, and if so, what amount would have to be determined by the lower Court.
4. In respect of item 6 the objection is taken on behalf of the respondents that it is not the whole item now shown as item 6 in the schedule to the plaint that was part of the estate of the last male holder and that it was only a part of it that related to the estate, the other part having been purchased by the present holders from third parties altogether. As, however, the lower Court has found that it is only a portion of item 6 that was really part of the estate of the last male holder, it would follow that the relief to which the plaintiff is entitled must be confined to that part. The decree of the lower Court is reversed with respect to items 6 and 18 and the case will be remanded to the lower Court in order to make the enquiry and give findings with regard to all the matters already indicated. The plaintiff would also be entitled to an enquiry as to the amount of mesne profits which defendants 21 to 24 are liable to pay to him in respect of the said item. Each party will bear his own costs of the appeal.