1. One of the properties concerned in the suit by the appellant was a house in which he had been residing. Under a compromise decree, this house was awarded to the respondent. It was argued that this compromise was not binding on the appellant. That contention was upheld; but the trial Court came to the conclusion that the family agreement, upon which the compromise decree was based, was binding on the minor appellant. Even if the correctness of the decision of the lower Court with regard to the binding nature of this agreement is open to question, the plaintiffs failed to prove to the satisfaction of the trial Court that the house in question was joint family property. The suit was dismissed. During the pendency of an appeal to the District Court of Madura, the appellant prayed for an interim injunction, restraining the respondent from executing his decree by dispossessing him of the house. That prayer was refused; and against that order this appeal has been filed.
2. It is clear from a mere perusal of Order 39, Rule 1, that this case would not come within that rule; but it is argued that the lower appellate Court had inherent jurisdiction to grant a temporary injunction ex debito justitiae. The learned advocate for the appellant relies in that connection on Kanshiram v. Sharaf Din A.I.R. 1923 Lah. 144, where it is said, following another decision of the same High Court (the Punjab Chief Court), that the Civil Procedure Code is not exhaustive and that the Court has inherent jurisdiction to act ex debito justitiae in order to do that real and substantial justice, for the administration of which alone it exists. I however find myself in complete accord with Varadachariar, J., who had to consider the same question in Murugesa Mudaliar v. Angamuthu Mudaliar : AIR1938Mad190 . The learned Judge there remarked,
I am aware it has been some times held that Order 39, Rules 1 and 2 are not exhaustive of the Court's power to grant a temporary injunction....Whatever may be said as to the power of the High Court to issue injunction for other purposes and to punish disobedience thereof in exer-cise of its own inherent power as a Court of record, the power of Subordinate Courts must be found within the four corners of the Code and it seems to me too much to suggest that, when the Code has expressly dealt with injunctions in Order 39, Section 151 can be invoked to add to the powers thus conferred.
The above is the view that has been generally held in this High Court, e.g., Varada-charyulu v. Narasimhacharyulu (1925) 23 L.W. 85.
3. The appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.
4. C.M.A. No. 603 of 1947 raises the same point as has been discussed in C.M.A. No. 602 of 1947; it also fails and is dismissed with costs.