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The Public Prosecutor Vs. Sankaralingam Moopan - Court Judgment

LegalCrystal Citation
CourtChennai
Decided On
Judge
Reported in50Ind.Cas.1003
AppellantThe Public Prosecutor
RespondentSankaralingam Moopan
Excerpt:
madras local boards act (v mad. of 1884), section 98(1), (2) - 'other person duly authorised as aforesaid', meaning of--delegation of authority. - 1. we cannot agree with the sub divisional magistrate that the words other person duly authorised as aforesaid,' in section 98(2) of the local boards act refer only to 'some person duly authorized by him in that behalf' mentioned in section 91(1), for we think that the use of the single word 'other' precludes this view, which would require the word 'any' or 'such other' to support it. in our opinion there must be a separate authorisation under each clause of the section, and the words 'as aforesaid' in clause 2 must be read as meaning 'by him in that behalf.' in this view the notice issued by the union chairman was valid, as authority has been given to him by exhibit c. section 33 of the act does not restrict specific delegations allowed by other sections of the act, and there is no.....
Judgment:

1. We cannot agree with the Sub Divisional Magistrate that the words other person duly authorised as aforesaid,' in Section 98(2) of the Local Boards Act refer only to 'some person duly authorized by him in that behalf' mentioned in Section 91(1), for we think that the use of the single word 'other' precludes this view, which would require the word 'any' or 'such other' to support it. In our opinion there must be a separate authorisation under each clause of the section, and the words 'as aforesaid' in Clause 2 must be read as meaning 'by him in that behalf.' In this view the notice issued by the Union Chairman was valid, as authority has been given to him by Exhibit C. Section 33 of the Act does not restrict specific delegations allowed by other sections of the Act, and there is no reason to read the words 'other person' as meaning Vice President alone.

2. The case against accused being a summons case no charge was necessary, and as accused was represented by a Vakil he must have been aware of the charge against him, and could not have been prejudiced by the Magistrate's omission to explain it to him.

3. We set aside the order of acquittal and confirm the conviction and sentence of the Sub-Magistrate.


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