1. This appeal arises from an application made by the 7th creditor in the Insolvency proceedings of one Tirumula Goun-dan. The 7th creditor claimed to prove for Rs. 7,000. The Official Receiver allowed the claim in part but disallowed it in respect of the amount claimed under the Promissory-Note Ex. B. The creditor then applied to the District Judge under Section 68 of the Insolvency Act against the order of the Official Receiver and prayed that the whole of his claim may be allowed. The learned District Judge, after considering the circumstances of the case and the evidence, has granted him his prayer, and the present appeal is by the 15th respondent, one of the other creditors.
2. Two points have been taken before us as vitiating the order of the District Judge altogether. The first is that the order was passed without making the Official Receiver a formal party to the application before the District Judge The creditors apparently were all made parties and notice had been given to all the creditors including the 15th respondent, the appellant now before us. He appeared before the District Judge and opposed the claim of the 7th creditor, Apparently, the Official Receiver was not made a formal party respondent to the application before the District Judge but we do not think that that can be treated as in any way materially affecting the order of the District Judge. It was open to any of tha creditors either to appear themselves as the 15th creditor did to oppose the proof tendered by the 7th creditor before the District Court or to have moved the Official Receiver to represent the whole party of creditors before that Court and to state their objections to the proof tendered. The Official Receiver is after all an officer of the Court and there is no provision in the Insolvency Act, so far as we can see, which makes it obligatory on the District Court to have the Official Receiver made a formal party to these proceedings. If the Official Receiver wanted to be heard, there would have been no difficulty whatsoever in the matter as we have no doubt that the District Judge would have heard him. The Official Receiver has been made a party to this appeal before us, but he has not come here and complained that he has been prejudiced in any way by his not being heard on this matter in the lower Court. Reliance has been placed on Mangaluri Sivaramayya v. Singet-mahanti Bhujanga Rao reported in 80 Ind. Cas. 708 : 18 M.L.J. 200 : 89 M. 598, by the appellant's Vakil in favour of his contention. But there we notice that the Official Receiver was directed to execute a document in favour of the creditor who required that the whole of the assets of the Insolvent should be transferred to him in accordance with an agreement which he entered into with the insolvent be-'' fore the Insolvency. Whether in such a case as that the Official Receiver should be formally made a party and his objections heard or not, we need not consider here, for, in the present case, we see no reason why the Official Receiver should have been made a formal party as, in the circumstances of this case, it was as already stated, open to him to have come up and stated any objections that he might have had to the proof tendered. We may state that he knew of the proceedings that were going on in the Insolvency Court itself. In these circumstances, the first objection is not a valid one and is overruled.
3. The next objection is that the District Judge acted upon some statements made by the parties before the Official Receiver.. Here, again, the District Judge was considering the propriety of the action of the Official Receiver which he had taken, as the evidence that was laid before him and the question which the District Judge had to decide was whether on that evidence, the order of the Official Receiver was a right one and should be supported. The case cited by the appellant's Vakil, Ghinna-meera Bawuthar v. Kumara Ghakravarthi Aiyangar 36 Ind. Cas. 906 had reference to an application under Section 36 of the old Insolvency Act and related to the annulment of a document which the Offioial Receiver had applied to the Court to annul. The Official Receiver was himself the applioant and it was held that any statement taken by him could not be treated as evidence because the matter itself was being tried before the District Court as a matter between the alienee on the one side and the Official Receiver on the other. Such is not the position here at all. Here the District Judge is merely considering the correctness of the order of the Official Receiver, and in such a case as this we do not see any objection to the District Judge acting on the evidence given before the Official Receiver. Nor is there any provision in the Act itself for necessitating the District Court to take fresh evidence in such matters. We do not say that it would not have been open to the District Court to take suoh evidence, if it thought desirable to do so, but there is no provision laying down any obligation or the District Court to do so. In these ciroumstanoes, the two objections that have been raised to the order of the lower Court fail.
4. On the merits, the only argument addressed to us is that, as in a previous annulment proceeding this creditor had given up his interest in the land so far as his mortgage was concerned and agreed to treat himself as an unsecured creditor for the amount of consideration which, he should prove like any other creditor, his claim must be looked upon with suspicion. What the exact reason for his doing so was we do not know. But the fact that he did so cannot be taken as conclusive on the question that the money was not due as a personal debt.
5. No other ground has been alleged against the order of the District Judge. We, therefore, confirm that order and dismiss this appeal with costs of the 7th creditor to be paid by the appellant, the 15th creditor.