Skip to content


Senthattikalai Pandia Chinna Thambiar and anr. Vs. K. Rama Iyer - Court Judgment

LegalCrystal Citation
SubjectLimitation
CourtChennai
Decided On
Reported inAIR1936Mad704
AppellantSenthattikalai Pandia Chinna Thambiar and anr.
RespondentK. Rama Iyer
Cases ReferredSecretary of State v. Parashram Madhavarao
Excerpt:
- - no doubt there has been a good deal of conflict of opinion as regards the question whether the words 'to establish a periodically recurring right' would include a claim to recover arrears of money due under the right claimed, but so far as this court is concerned the matter is concluded by the full bench decision in zamorin of calicut v. the appeals therefore fail and are dismissed with costs in a......it is however contended by the appellant that article 131, limitation act, cannot apply to the present suits because they are not suits in respect of periodically recurring rights. article 131, limitation act, relates to suits to establish a periodically recurring right. no doubt there has been a good deal of conflict of opinion as regards the question whether the words 'to establish a periodically recurring right' would include a claim to recover arrears of money due under the right claimed, but so far as this court is concerned the matter is concluded by the full bench decision in zamorin of calicut v. achutha menon 1914 38 mad 916, in which it was held that the words 'to establish a periodically recurring right' are sufficient to include claims to recover arrears.3. the question.....
Judgment:

Pandrang Row, J.

1. These are appeals from orders of the District Judge of Tinnevelly dated 10th February 1934 in three connected appeals allowing the appeals and remanding the suits to the trial Court for fresh disposal. The suits were dismissed 'by the trial Court on the ground that they were barred by limitation, and the other issues framed in them were not decided. The lower appellate Court was of opinion that there was no bar of limitation and therefore remanded the suits for fresh disposal.

2. The present appeals are by the defendant in all the three suits, namely, the Zamindar of Sivagiri, and the only point raised in these appeals is whether the suits are barred by limitation. The real question is which is the article of the Limitation Act applicable to the suits in -question. If the suits are governed by Article 131, Limitation Act, as contended by the respondents, there can be no doubt that the suits are not barred by limitation. It is however contended by the appellant that Article 131, Limitation Act, cannot apply to the present suits because they are not suits in respect of periodically recurring rights. Article 131, Limitation Act, relates to suits to establish a periodically recurring right. No doubt there has been a good deal of conflict of opinion as regards the question whether the words 'to establish a periodically recurring right' would include a claim to recover arrears of money due under the right claimed, but so far as this Court is concerned the matter is concluded by the Full Bench decision in Zamorin of Calicut v. Achutha Menon 1914 38 Mad 916, in which it was held that the words 'to establish a periodically recurring right' are sufficient to include claims to recover arrears.

3. The question therefore has been argued mainly on the ground that the right agitated in these suits is not a periodically recurring right and reliance is placed on the decision in Gulam Ghouse Khan Sahib v. Jannia : (1920)39MLJ492 . Both these decisions were considered by the lower appellate Court and that Court was of opinion that the present suits are governed by the decision of the Full Bench in Zamorin of Calicut v. Achutha Menon 1914 33 Mad 916. In Gulam Ghouse Khan Sahib v. Jannia : (1920)39MLJ492 a distinction was drawn between a periodically recurring right and a perpetual right and there can be no doubt that this distinction is a real one but that does not mean that the right claimed in the present suits is a perpetual right. According to the defendant himself what is claimed in the suits as manibam is a grant of the assessment and his case was that this was to be availed of by the grantee by asking the Zamindar to forbear from collecting the assessment and not by claiming a cash payment from the Zamindar. The right is obviously one to recover a certain sum of money out of the revenue collections of the village. In other words, the right claimed, is a right to receive an annual payment and it is not alleged that the payment is subject to performance of any service. The allowances claimed in the present suits are therefore similar to allowances that were the subject matter of the Full Bench decision in Zamorin of Calicut v. Achutha Menon 1914 38 Mad 916, namely adima allowances. In that case it was not contended that the right to receive adima allowances was not a periodically recurring right, and the decision of the Full Bench is inconsistent with the present contention that the right to receive annual allowances is not a periodically recurring right. No doubt there is no express decision in Zamorin of Calicut v. Achutha Menon 1914 38 Mad 916 to the effect that the right to receive adima allowances is a. periodically recurring right but the decision implies that it is such a right.

4. I found also that in Ramnad Zamindar v. Dorasami (1884) 7 Mad 341, it was held that the right to recover from a Zamindar a monthly allowance due under an agreement was held to be a periodically recurring right and that a suit in respect of such a right is governed by Article 131, Limitation Act. A somewhat similar case is the one in Sakharam Hari v. Lakmipriya Tirtha Swami (1910) 34 Bom 349. Though the decision in Sakharam Hari v. Lakmipriya Tirtha Swami (1910) 34 Bom 349 was not followed in a subsequent decision of the same High Court, namely in Janardan Trimbak v. Dinkar Hari 1931 55 Bom 193, the point on which the latter Bench differed from the former was as regards the interpretation of the words to establish' found in Article 131, Limitation Act, and not on the nature of the right, namely whether it can be regarded as a periodically recurring right or not.

5. It is also seen that in Secretary of State v. Parashram Madhavarao 1934 58 Bom 306, a case which went up to the Judicial Committee, it was held that where a hereditary officer claimed a percentage of the assessment collected in a village from the Government, the right was a periodically recurring right and that Article 131, Limitation Act, was applicable. I have no doubt that in the present case the claim to get an annual allowance from and out of the revenue collections is a periodically recurring right and that the suits are therefore governed by Article 131, Limitation Act. It follows from this that the suits are not barred by limitation as found by the lower appellate Court. The appeals therefore fail and are dismissed with costs in A.A.O. Nos. 265 and 267 of 1934. Leave to appeal is refused.


Save Judgments// Add Notes // Store Search Result sets // Organizer Client Files //