1. The order which is in question before us was passed in a suit instituted by the plaintiff, the predecessors of the present Raja of Kalahasti, for the recovery of certain villages from the defendant and for other reliefs. These villages had been originally us ufruoturily mortgaged and thereafter a document was executed purporting to be a deed of sale in favour of the first defendant's adoptive father, one Rajah D. K. Seshachalapathi Nayanim Yarn. The second defendant is the widow of the gentleman and the eighth defendant is a supplemental defendant who claims to be entitled to the rights of the first and second defendants under a purchase or assignment. A Receiver was appointed by consent of parties, that is, the plaintiff and the first defendant. When the sixth defendant name on record he made an application for the discharge of the Receiver, namely, on the ground that he had acquired the rights of the first) and second defendants, that there was no longer any dispute which would lead to mismanagement or waste, and that, therefore, the continuance of the Receiver became unnecessary. The learned Subordinate Judge accepted this view of the situation and passed an order discharging the Receiver. It is contended by the learned Advocate General that since the Receiver was appointed by the consent of the parties he could not be discharged until the termination of the proceedings. It if, however, the law, as laid down in Kerron Receivers, p. 287, that, 'if in the course of the proceedings, the continuant a Receiver became unnecessary, he will be discharged,' This proposition finds support in Bainbrigge v. Blair (1), where Lord Lansdale, M. R., says : 'What I have to consider is, that one party ought to have proper protection, and the other ought not to be unnecessarily charged with the costs of a Receiver and I think I ought not to continue the Receiver, if I am satisfied that he may he discharged without injury to the legatees.' The question then comes to this, whether there is sufficient reliance to be placed in the trustees, on whose affidavit the Receiver was discharged. In this case we think that, since eigth defendant (1) is willing to furnish security for the future rents and profits of the property for two years, (2) undertakes to pay the peishkush due on the villages to the extent of Rs. 10,000 a year from the current Fasli 1330 and for future Fashs and (3) also undertakes to keep and file accounts regularly in Court once every six months on account of these villages, it is no longer necessary to charge the estate with the expenses of a Receiver. On these terms, therefore, we son-firm the order of the lower Court. The lower Court will ascertain what the future profits are likely to be and take security in accordance with that within two months from the date of such ascertainment.