Basheer Ahmed Sayeed, J.
1. C.C.C.A. No. 41 of 1953 is an appeal deferred by the 2nd defendant against the judgment and decree of the second additional City Civil Judge, in O.S. No. 1109 of 1951. Along with this O.S. No. 1237 of 1951 was also tried and a common judgment was passed in both the suits. C.C.O.A. No. 42 of 1953 is an appeal against the judgment and decree of the first Additional City civil Judge, in O.S. No. 1060 of 1951. The 2nd defendant has preferred the appeal in this also. There is of course, no appeal preferred by the 2nd defendant in O.S. No. 1237 of 1951. The two appeals have been argued by learned Counsel Mr. T. Krishnaswami Iyengar for the appellants.
2. The suits were originally filed for the recovery of a sum of Rs. 5,000 with interest and costs, due on two dishonoured cheques which have been issued by the 2nd defendant in favour of the 1st defendant who, in turn endorsed them over to the two plaintiffs in the suits. The cheques were dated 11th June, 1951, but they were drawn on the 24th April, 1951. It transpires that they were endorsed over in favour of the plaintiffs in the two suits on the 27th April, 1951. When they were presented for payment on the due date they were dishonoured. The plaintiffs who had taken the cheques for valuable consideration thereupon filed the suits out of which the two appeals have arisen.
3. The learned City Civil judges who tried the two suits, after framing the necessary issues and considering the oral and documentary evidence, came to the conclusion that the plaintiffs in both the suits were holders-in-due course and that they were entitled to maintain the suits on the cheques, that consideration had passed for the endorsement, and therefore, they decreed the two suits. The and defendant has therefore preferred the appeals in both the suits.
4. Mr. Krishnaswami Iyengar appearing on behalf of the common appellant in both the suits, contends that the learned City Civil judges were not right in their conclusion that the plaintiffs were holders in due course. His point is that the learned City Civil Judges ought to have held that in view of the fact that the cheques themselves were dated 11th June, 1951, and were transferred long before the actual date for payment, it must be presumed that the plaintiffs had notice of the circumstances in which the promissory notes came into existence. But this argument ignores the findings of the learned City Civil Judges based on the fact that the 2nd defendant himself gave evidence to the effect that the plaintiffs were not aware of the alleged arrangement between the 2nd defendant and the 1st defendant. The argument relied upon by the 2nd defendant was that these cheques should be presented for payment only after all the goods ordered for had been delivered to the 2nd defendant. In the face of the defendant's own evidence that the plaintiffs were not aware of any such arrangement the learned Counsel cannot be heard to say that the plaintiffs had notice of the arrangement between the 1st and the 2nd defendants. The uniform practice, it transpires seems to have been, between these three merchanis, dealing in skins and hides, that post-dated cheques were issued and received towards payment and that they should be realised on the due dates, and they were also negotiated as such. Such being the case, there is no substance in the contention that the plaintiffs were aware of any arrangement between the first defendant and the 2nd defendant in regard to payment when the cheques were issued. The learned City Civil Judges were right therefore in having come to the conclusion that the plaintiffs could not be said to have had notice of any such arrangement.
5. In the next place, it was argued that the cheques were not supported by consideration in view of the fact that consideration alleged in respect of the cheques was only past consideration. This argument was rightly not pressed by the learned Counsel for the appellant. For, past consideration is as good as present consideration or future consideration and a transaction cannot be held to be not supported by consideration if the consideration for the transaction was a past one.
6. The third point argued by the learned Counsel was that post-dated cheques were not negotiable and the assignment in favour of the plaintiffs, was not enforceable. Such assignment would not also make the plaintiffs holders in due course was the further argument. There seems to be no substance in this contention as well. The learned Counsel for the respondents has invited my attention to Bank of Baroda, Ltd. v. Punjab National Bank and Ors. : AIR1942Cal562 , which has also been cited before the learned City Civil judges. That seems to be sufficient authority for the proposition that post dated cheques are as much negotiable as cheques for which payment is due immediately on presentation. Another decision reported in Partabchand Ratanchand v. Gilbert 151 IND.CAS.287, has also been referred to by the learned Counsel for the respondents in support of the same proposition. The learned Counsel for appellant, however, has not cited any authority for his contention that post-dated cheques are not negotiable. Nor has he shown any reason as to why post-dated cheques should be held to be non-negotiable.
7. In these circumstances, the learned City Civil Judges have come to the right conclusion in both the suits when they held that the plaintiffs in the respective suits were holders in due-course, and that they were entitled to recover the money due under the cheques, assigned in their favour by the second defendant. Therefore, it follows that the judgment and decree of the learned City Civil Judges are correct and are hereby confirmed. These appeals are dismissed. One set of costs will be divided among the respondents in the two Appeals.