Pandrang Row, J.
1. This is an appeal from the decree of the Subordinate Judge of Dindigul dated 6th February 1933 in A.S. No. 37 of.1933, which was an appeal from the order made in execution' of the decree in 0 Section No. 298 of 1932 by the Districc Munsif of Peria Julam. The first judgment-debtor therein pleaded under Order 21, Rule 2, Civil P.C. that the-decree had been adjusted by the decree-holder accepting a Bum of Rs. 500 from him in full settlement of the decree and? he prayed the Court to record this-adjustment under Order 21, Rule 2. This petition was dismissed by the District. Munsif on the preliminary ground that the judgment-debtor could not be permitted to prove the alleged adjustment in view of the provisions of Section 92, Evidence Act. On appeal, the Subordinate' Judge found that the District Munsif's view was wrong and that the judgment-debtor was entitled to prove the adjustment by oral evidence and remanded! the petition to the District Munsif for-disposal on the merits. In this appeal the only point raised is that it is not open to the judgment-debtor in this case to establish the adjustment in question by adducing oral evidence and reliance is placed in support of this position on the provisions of Section 92, Evidence Act. This section prohibits the admission of evidence of any oral agaeement or statement in any matter required by law to be reduced to the form of; a document for the purpose of contradicting, varying, adding to or subtracting from the terms as embodied in, in the written document.
2. This section does not exclude oral evidence alone, but any kind of evidence of an oral agreement or statement of a, particular kind for the purpose of changing the terms of the document. It was conceded in the argument before me by: the appellant's advocate that if the receipt which had been filed by the judgment-debtor in support of his application which evidences the payment of Rs. 500 had stated in itself that it. was in full satisfaction of the decree there could be no objection to the-adjustment being recorded. In other words, that would be regarded as not being within the bar of Section 92, Evidence Act. But he asks that in the present case as the receipt does not state that it is in full satisfaction of the claim, the adjustment pleaded implies a previous oral agreement whereby a smaller amount was agreed to be accepted ink complete satisfaction. But even in the case of a written receipt recording full satisfaction there would ordinarily be in point of fact a previous oral agreement, because ordinarily no written document is written unless there is an oral arrangement or agreement beforehand, and the oral agreement is afterwards reduced to the form of a document. It is not possible to split up the adjustment in this manner so as to make it rest entirely on the previous oral arrangement or agreement.
3. What the judgment-debtor wants to plead in this case is not that a new agreement or new arrangement has been entered into between the parties which takes the place of the decree, but that the decree itself has come to an end and has been fully satisfied. He does not seek to prove any oral agreement or any oral statement which has the effect of changing the terms of the decree. In fact it is not his case that the terms of the decree have been in any way changed. His case is that in spite of the 'decree being as it is the decree holder (actually accepted a smaller sum than (was due to him under the decree in full isatisfaction of the decree. I am of (opinion that in these circumstances there is nothing in the provisions of IS. 92, Evidence Act which prevents him from proving that there has been an [adjustment of the decree as alleged by him and to prove such adjustment by oral evidence. The appeal therefore is dismissed with costs.