1. This is a revision petition filed against the order of remand made by the learned District Judge of Chingleput in regard to the concurrent order of eviction made by the Rent Controller, Chingleput, and the appellate authority, the learned Subordinate Judge of Chingleput under the Madras Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act.
2. The facts are : The petitioner, landlord, before me, filed an application before the Rent Controller for eviction of the respondent, tenant, from his house on the two grounds permissible under the Act cited above, viz., wilful default in payment of rent and that he (landlord) required the premises for his bona fide occupation. The tenant could be evicted under either of these grounds. Both the Rent Controller and the Appellate Authority found that the tenant was plainly guilty of wilful default in the payment of rent. Therefore, they ordered eviction of the tenant. In the revision provided under Section 12-B of Act, viz., empowering the District Judge to call for and examine the records relating to any order or proceeding under this Act for the purpose of satisfying himself as to the legality or propriety of such order or proceeding, the learned District Judge, without applying his mind at all to the question whether the eviction ordered on the ground of wilful default was illegal or irregular or improper, set aside the orders of the lower Courts and remanded the matter for fresh disposal by the Rent Controller, in the light of the observations made by him, viz., that the application should have been disposed of also on the other ground for eviction raised but not gone into because the ground of wilful default was sufficient for disposal of the eviction petition. Thereupon the present revision petition has been preferred to this Court.
3. The scope of revisional powers under this Act have been the subject-matter of repeated decisions the substance of which is that in revision it would not be proper for the revisional Court to substitute its own appreciation of the evidence in place of that of the Court below. The mere fact that if it had tried the case it would have come to a different conclusion on the facts would be no ground for interference with a finding of fact. The distinction between revision and appeal must be maintained and revisional proceedings should not be converted into an appeal. There can be no interference with findings of fact unless the finding has been reached by a consideration of irrelevant or inadmissible matter or it is so perverse that no reasonable person could have reached that conclusion. Unless there is something palpably wrong with the finding of facts which is backed by evidence a revisional Court should not interfere with it. There can be no interference on questions of law unless any provision has been misconstrued or there is an erroneous understanding of the law applicable to the matter. The powers under Section 12-B are intended to be exercised with a view to subserve and not defeat the ends of justice. Where, therefore, substantial justice has been rendered, the revisional Court will not interfere merely because it has jurisdiction to do so. These principles apply mutatis mutandis to the District Judge and High Court. The revisional powers, though wide, are discretionary and have got to be exercised not as a matter of course, but only in the interests of justice. It is not obligatory on the District Judge in every case when an application is made to it under Section 12-B (1) to call for the records. It is not necessary that in every case arising under Section 12-B (1) the District Judge must record his reasons for declining to interfere in revision; Balasubramania Pillai v. Govindarajulu Naidu (1955) 2 M.L.J. (N.R.C.) page 3 Shambagavalli v. Dana Lakshmi (1933) 2 M.L.J. (N.R.C.) page 21 In re Murugayya Pillai (1954) 2 M.L.J. 59 Krishnaveni Ammal v. Danushkoti Nadar C.R.P. No. 1241 of 1955 (1956) 2 M.L.J. (N.R.C.) page 57; Sasiwarana Thevar v. Ponnu : AIR1948Mad422 ) Edn. at pp. 177-178.
4. Bearing these principles in mind if we examine the facts of this case, we find that the remand ordered by the learned District Judge is thoroughly improper. The parties have been content to get the eviction matter disposed of on one of the two grounds put forward and the decision of one of which was sufficient for the disposal of the controversy. The Rent Controller in the last paragraph of his order states:
I therefore consider that the respondent has been guilty of wilful default in payment of rent to the petitioner, who is consequently entitled to an order of eviction. That being so, I do not think it is necessary for me to go into the second ground of application, viz., petitioner's requirement for the suit shop for the use of the estate.
The learned Appellate Authority, in paragraph 3 of his judgment, states:
The lower Court has not given a finding as regards the question whether the premises was required for the use of the petitioner and no arguments were also advanced before me in that respect. Therefore, I do not give any finding on this point.
In these circumstances the remand was improper and is not sustainable. When such is the case the fact that even the parties were not averse to a remand, lest probably worse might befall them, is no ground for a remand. Remand is an exercise of judicial discretion by the learned District Judge which cannot be abdicated, and in regard to which there can be no judicial self-abnegation and rested on the halfhearted acquiescence of the parties who might be fearful that if they appeared unduly obstructive to what the learned District Judge was thinking to be a proper course, worse might befall them.
5. In the result, the revision is allowed and in the circumstances without costs-The orders of the lower Court and the appellate Sub-Court are restored.