Govinda Menon, J.
1. The Srirangam Municipality seeks to revise the order of the Special Bench of Magistrates, Srirangam, in S.T. No. 488 of 1946 acquitting the respondent therein of an offence under the District Municipalities Act in that he carried on the business of selling in retail grain, pulses, etc., without taking out a licence from the Municipality under Section 249 read with Schedule V of the District Munici-palities Act V of 1920. The prosecution case was that during the years 1945-46 the respondent was a dealer carrying on business, in retail, of purchase and sale of grains, pulses, etc., in shop Nos. 82 and 83, South Royagopuram Bazaar, Srirangam; and for the purpose of this business he did not take out a licence as contemplated by the statute. Therefore, he was guilty of an offence punishable under Section 313 of the District Municipalities Act. The Municipal Health Officer, Srirangam, was the complainant under the authority granted by the Commissioner of the Municipality. The accused's answer to this charge was that Schedule V, Clause (0) of the District Municipalities Act was amended only by G.O. No. 131 Public Health, dated 18th January, 1944, and that thereafter there was no notification published in the District Gazette and by beat of drum that the retail sale of grain and pulses without a licence from the Municipality had been prohibited without a licence as a result of the amendment to the Clause (0) of the fifth Schedule. The Municipality, on the other hand, contended that the publication of a notification in the Trichinopoly District Gazette supplement on the 12 th August, 1921, stating that no place within the Srirangam Municipality or within a distance of three miles of such municipal limits exclusive of the Trichino-poly municipal limits shall be used for one or more of the purposes mentioned in Schedule V to the District Municipalities Act without a chairman's licence and except in accordance with the conditions imposed by him in the licence was sufficient publication. The Bench of Magistrates accepted the plea of the respondent and acquitted him.
2. The learned Counsel for the Municipality contends that Ex. H, the notification was sufficient compliance with the requirements of Section 249 because when once the Municipality has stated that one or more of the purposes mentioned in Schedule V, cannot be carried on without a licence, it is tantamount to saying that such a publication should enure even if the purposes mentioned in the schedule have been increased by the addition of fresh purposes or decreased by the reduction of certain purposes mentioned therein. According to him, what is contemplated by Section 249 is that the original publication must be taken as complying with all the future requirements of the statute even though the purposes have been increased or decreased. It is difficult to accept this contention for the reason that Section 249 makes it clear that an omnibus publication of the then existing purposes at a particular time will not be sufficient compliance with the statute because the words used are ' any one or more of the purposes specified in Schedule V.' This shows that it is open to the Municipality at a particular time to prohibit the use of any place within the area mentioned in Section 249 for the carrying on of any one business or more than one business or all the businesses mentioned in Schedule V. If the Legislature had intended that an original publication like Ex. H would satisfy the requirements of Section 249 even after the addition of fresh purposes, then in my opinion, the words ' one or more of the purposes ' would not have been used there. The section would have read ' shall be used for any of the purposes specified at a time in Schedule V.' If the section had been enacted with these words, any addition or subtraction from the purposes will not necessitate fresh publication. Therefore I see no reason to depart from the plain words of the section, put a strained construction on it and thereby enlarge the scope of Section 249.
3. In view of my interpretation of Section 249 it is unnecessary to consider the points raised by Mr. Subba Rao for respondent relying on Sections 78 to 80 of the Local Boards Act and the decisions in the Taluk Board, Koilpatti v. Volkart United Press Co., Ltd. (1935) 42 L.W. 430 and the Municipal Council of Tellicherry v. Mayankutti Keyi (1935) 42 L.W. 684. The revision petition is dismissed.