K. Veeraswami, J.
1. The only substantial point that arises in the appeal is one of limitation. The Sivagiri estate was notified and taken over with effect from 3rd January, 1951, under the provisions of Madras Act XXVI of 1948. Respondents 1 and 2, who are the illegitimate sons of the principal landholder, applied by O.P. No. 167 of 4951 for maintenance. The principal landholder, who was the only party impleaded, opposed the claim under Section 42, and successfully. Against the order of the Tribunal dated 9th August, 1954, rejecting the claim, the respondents filed S. T. A. No. 138 of 1954, which was eventuallv allowed by this Court on 25th. January, 1960. In the meantime, on 16th August, 1955, the principal landholder died and his legal representatives were brought on record in the appeal. This Court was of the view that the respondents in view of a special custom, were entitled to maintenance. See Chelladorai v. Chinnathambiar I.L.R. : AIR1961Mad42 . On that view of the right of the respondent to get maintenance, this Court remitted the original petition filed by them for fresh disposal by the Tribunal. On 22nd July, 1961, the respondents filed I.A. No. 303 of 1961 by which they prayed to implead the present appellants as respondents in the original petition. The appellants are the sons of the landholder previous to the principal landholder and are maintenance holders recognised by the provisions of the Act. Eventually, the claim for maintenance by the respondents was allowed on 27th November, 1961. In doing so, the Tribunal not only reallocated the quantum of shares the appellants and the respondents would each be entitled to out of the compensation deposited, but also directed that the excess drawn by the appellants prior to 27th November, 1961, should be restituted. The appeal before us is from that order.
2. As we mentioned earlier, the only point raised for the appellants is that the order of the Tribunal in so far as it related to restitution of the excess drawn out of the compensation by the appellants cannot be supported as the respondent's claim to maintenance, vis-a-vis the appellants, can be regarded as having been made only on 22nd July, 1961, when the respondents made the application to implead the appellants as party respondents in that claim for maintenance. The Tribunal did not accept this view. It said that there was no question of limitation because the respondents came forward with their claim as early as 1951, and those petitions were still pending. The Tribunal added that the fact that some of the objectors were paid a share as maintenance-holders in accordance with the orders passed by the Tribunal on 5th January, 1954, would not confer upon them any superior right. It seems to us that the conclusion of the Tribunal that no question of limitation arises is correct, though we would say so on a different ground. Section 42 (1) does prescribe a period of limitation, viz., six months from the date of the deposit for making a claim out of compensation. Discretion was given to the Tribunal to extend the time, but subject to a limit of six months. Amendments have since been carried out to Section 42 by Madras Act XXI of 1963, with which we are not however, concerned as the impugned order was made prior to that Act, and on as we said, 27th November, 1961. The period of limitation was prescribed only in respect of every person claiming the compensation. The time limit, therefore applied with reference to the claim to or against the compensation and not against any particular person or party. It may be visualised that in particular cases a claim to or against compensation may be made without there being any opponent, or a rival claimant. The analogy of Section 22 of the old Limitation Act does not hold good in respect of the scope of the limitation prescribed by Section 42(1). Section 42 (1) has nothing to do with particular parties, but deals only with claims to or against compensation and the limitation is related to such a claim. It follows, therefore, the contention of the appellants that the claim of the respondents so far as the appeals are concerned should be regarded as having been made only on 22nd July, 1961, cannot be accepted. The appeal is dismissed but with no costs.