1. The really important question in this appeal is whether the order of the Deputy Collector in Civil Miscellaneous Petition No. 38 of 1909 operated as res judicata on the question whether rent was payable in kind or in cash. That order was passed on an application made to the Deputy Collector under Section 74 of the Madras Estates Land Act; that is, an application for appraisement, division or determination of the crops where rent is taken by such means. The Revenue Inspector was appointed as provided under Section 74 to make an award. An objection was taken on behalf of the tenants before the Collector that the rent was not payable by division or appraisement. The Collector went into, the matter and upheld that objection.
2. It is contended before us that that finding of the Collector operated as res judicata and bars the present suit. We think the learned District Judge is right in holding that it has no such effect. Under Section 75 of the Act what the officer deputed by the Collector could do was to make an award embodying the result of his enquiry on the question of division or appraisement of the crops. That is to say, his award should consist of a finding as to how much of the crops was payable to the landlord as rent or how much money he was entitled to upon his share of the crops by appraisement of such crops. If the Collector found that rent was payable by division or appraisement of the crops it was open to him to confirm or modify the award, as it ought to be done. Then the award so confirmed or modified would, as provided in Section 75, have the effect of a decree for arrears of rent. There is nothing in the Section 75 to show that if the Collector found on objection made by the tenants that the rent was not payable by division or appraisement, that finding would have the effect of a decree and we can well understand that the Legislature did not intend to make any such provision. The proceedings under Sections 74 and 75 are more or less of a summary character. No appeal is provided. It would be difficult to conceive that when the Legislature in this very Act has laid down a procedure for the institution of a regular suit before the Revenue Officer for determining the question of rent, it should have, in Sections 74 and 75 of the Act, provided another and more summary remedy for a determination of the same question. If a suit is filed, a regular appeal is allowed. But there would be no such appeal, though the subject-matter of the decision would be the same, in matters coming under Sections 74 and 75 of the Act. Section 75 does not say anywhere that the finding of the Collector that rent was payable in cash, not in kind, would have the effect of a decree,
3. It has also been argued before us that the Deputy Collector ought to have granted an adjournment to enable certain witnesses of the defendant to attend Court, because summonses were taken out and that they did not attend as cholera was prevailing in the place. The Divisional Officer did consider the question and held that, as a matter of fact, the defendant had sufficient opportunity to produce his witnesses and there was no ground shown for granting further adjournment. The second appeal will be dismissed with costs.
4. Second Appeals Nos. 1700 and 1701 follow our judgment in Second Appeal No. 1699 of 1913, for the reasons mentioned therein and will be dismissed but without costs.