K. Veeraswami, J.
1. This appeal is from an order of the District Judge of South Arcot at Cuddalore apportioning compensation for land acquired which was deposited by the Land Acquisition Officer under Section 31(2) of the Land Acquisition Act. The deposit was made because he thought that there was a dispute as to its apportionment but he made no reference under Section 30 of the Act. The District Judge of his own accord initiated proceedings and deeided that the appellant and the respondent were entitled to the compensation amount deposited in equal moieties on the view that the two items of property acquired were owned by the appellant and the respondent's predecessor-in-title in common.
2. Item I which is a site of an extent of 55 cents with a tiled house thereon was purchased by the appellant on 26th April, 1934 in his own name. The other item is a land 31 cents in extent. The District Judge considered that the second item was ancestral property set apart for the maintenance of the appellant's mother and that the respondent who had purchased a half share from the appellant's brother was entitled to that half. It seems to me that no exception can be taken to this view of the District Judge.
3. But as regards item I, the decision of the District Judge appears to be clearly perverse. This will be patent from a perusal of his judgment itself to the effect that even though the sale deed in relation to item I was in the name of the first claimant (appellant) nevertheless he must establish that he has title to that item. He, therefore, in effect expected the appellant to adduce evidence that the respondent or his predecessor-in-title had no share in the property. The respondent himself remained ex parte. There was nothing to show that the appellant and the respondent's predecessor-in-title continued to be members of a joint Hindu family even on 26th April, 1934 when the appellant purchased the item. Nor was there any evidence to show that the purchase of that item was out of any part of the joint family funds or nucleus. In such circumstances the District Judge should have upheld the title of the appellant to the entirety of item I.
4. On behalf of the respondent it was urged that the appeal itself would be incompetent because the order of the District Judge was not one made on a reference under Section 30 and therefore, it could not be regarded as an award under Section 26(1). Where there is a dispute as regards the apportionment of compensation amount it is no doubt true that the Land Acquisition Officer himself may refer the dispute to the decision of the Court having jurisdiction under Section 30 and at the same time he may also deposit the compensation amount into Court under Section 31(2). In such a case the decision of the Court will be regarded as one under Section 26(1) and the order will have the effect of a decree under Section 26(2) from which an appeal would lie. But in this case for some reason which does not appear, the Land Acquisition Officer made, the deposit under Section 31(2) but made no reference under Section 30. Under the circumstances there is force in the contention for the respondent that no appeal would lie from an order made under Section 31. I am, however, inclined to convert the appeal into a revision under Section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code and it is done accordingly. It is contended for the respondent that even so, there is no error of jurisdiction. The contention is not altogether without force but I am satisfied that grave injustice has been caused by the District Judge declining to give effect to the sale deed dated 26th April, 1934 in favour of the appellant. As I said, the view of the District Judge on the question borders on perversity, that being the case, this Court feels justified in interfering with the order of the District Judge.
5. The Revision Petition, which form the appeal takes, is allowed in part and it is ordered that the appellant will be entitled to the entirety of the compensation for item I but the Civil Revision Petition is dismissed in respect of the second item. There will be no order as to costs in this Court.