Abdur Rahim, J.
1. The first point is really covered by a series of authorities of this Court laying down that the adoption of a daughter by a dancing girl is valid in this Presidency if it is not made for the purpose of making the girl a prostitute. We have been referred to certain adverse observations in some judgments of a very general character but the learned Pleader who appeared for the appellant admits that the authorities are all against him on that point.
2. It is found in this case that Vijayambal, the person who adopted the plaintiff, took the girl to help her in her household duties out of compassion for the helpless child and that she did not intend to force her to a life of prostitution. That being the finding, the adoption according to the rulings of this Presidency must be held to be a valid one.
3. Then the further question is raised as to whether the evidence warrants the inference that there was adoption within the meaning of the law. The whole argument of the learned Vakil turns really upon the use of the word 'abimanaputhri' That apparently is the word used in the muchilka, Exhibit B, in describing the adoption. Both Courts have found that as a matter of fact the plaintiff was adopted within the meaning of the law. It may be that that phrase abimanaputhri' ordinarily means that the chili which is so brought up is not regularly adopted. But evidence was given in the case with a view to show that, however the plaintiff was designated, she was in fact adopted by Vijayambal as her daughter. There is also evidence which has been accepted by both the Courts that according to the custom she, the plaintiff, being adopted though called abimanaputhri' was entitled to succeed her adoptive mother, I do not think, therefore, there is any substance in the point raised by the learned Vakil for the appellant.
4. Then there was also a question raised as to the jewels belonging to the deceased Vijayambal. It is attempted to be argued before us that even if the plaintiff was the adopted daughter she would not be entitled to those jewels. But no such plea was raised in either Courts or in the grounds, of appeal before us. I would, therefore, dismiss the second appeal with costs.
5. I agree.