1. Two point are taken before mo in this second appeal. The first point is that the defendants have acquired a title to permanent occupancy right by adverse possession since 1903 by denying the landlord's title and by not paying rent to him; and secondly, that the land is ryoti land and by the passing of the Estatss Land Act in 1908, the defendants have acquired occupancy right in the land by the virtue of Section 6 of the Act. Both these points have been fotfad against the defendants. On the first point, the learned District Judge has held that the decision in the previous suit between the parties for a declaration that the defendants had no occupancy right in the land, put an end to any claims that they might have had by reason of their possession. He holds that even assuming that that possession was adverse, the previous possession during the coursa of that litigation which ended in 1908 could not be added on to their subsequent possession to acquire a title by 12 years' possession. It is un-necessary to go into that question. The recent Madras case in Singaravelu Mudaliir v. Chokka Mudaliar A.I.R. 1923 Mad. 88 has taken a different view on the point but I do not propose to express any opinion on it because it is found by the Lower Appellate Court that the defendants were tenants who were paying waram, from 1893 and this is a question of fact which I must accept in second appeal. Ai tenants paying waram, they could not convert themselves into permanent occupancy ryots by a more assertion that they held the land under such a right. Sae for this position Nainapillai Marakayar v. Ramanathem Chettiar A.I.R. 1924 P.C. 65. It is unnecessary to refer to any other authority. Even if the defendants are entitled to tack on their previous possession during the time the previous litigation was going on to their possession after the date of that suit, that will not be sufficient to support the plea of adverse possession so far as the occupancy right is concerned.
2. As regards the question of their having acquired occupancy right under the Act, what the lower Courts have found is that the land is kamatam land and not ryoti land at all. That is a finding of fact arrived at on the evidence which I must accept. If the land is kamatam land and not ryoti land no rights can b3 obtained under Section 6 of the Estates Land Act. Saa for this position the authority in Ponnuswamy Paiayachi v. Karupudayan (1915) 38 Mad. 843. It is c intended that though the laud might have been karmtam land, it had been converted into ryoti land before the passing of the Act. There is no foundation for this at all. That is not a question raised in the issues in the trial Court. The second appeal, therefore fails, and is dismissed with costs.