William Watkin Phillips, J.
1. This is an appeal against the decree declaring that the mortgage executed by the 1st defendant in favour of the 2nd defendant is not binding on the plaintiff who represents the worshippers of the temple to which the mortgaged properties belong. The appeal is argued mainly on the question of limitation which was not raised in the lower Court until the time of arguments. The Subordinate Judge has found that the Article of the limitation applicable is Article 120 of the Schedule of the Limitation Act and that time has to be computed from the date on which the plaintiff becomes aware of the transaction in suit, and, consequently, that it would have been necessary to take further evidence in order to establish the fact that the plaintiff became aware of this transaction more than six years before the suit. It is now argued that this decision is wrong and that the period of limitation under Article 120 of the Limitation Act runs from the date of the alienation and not from the date of the knowledge of the plaintiff of the transaction. The words in the Article are 'when the right to sue accrues.' It was held in Ottapurakkal Thazhate Soopi v. Cherichil Pallikkal Up-pathumma 5 Ind. Cas. 698 : 33 M. 31 that when a karnavathi made an alienation which was sought to be set aside by some of the members of the tarwad, the suit was barred as being brought more than six years after the date of the alienation. It does not appear from the report of that case that there was any fraud alleged on the part of the karnavathi and, therefore, this case is perhaps not entirely applicable to the facts of the one we are considering That case, Ottapurakkal Thazhate Soopi v. Cherichil Pallikkal Uppathumma 5 Ind. Cas. 698 : 33 M. 31 was referred to in a subsequent case Prasanna Venkatachella Reddiar v. Collector of Trichinopoly 33 Ind. Cas. 45 : 38 M. 1064 where it was approved by one of the two Judges, whereas, the other one based his decision on the fact that the plaintiff bad knowledge of the transaction more than Six years before the suit. It is argued that the decision in the case is applicable here on the ground that the present suit is not one based on fraud. The plaint, however, shows that the plaintiff alleges a breach of trust and this preach consists in the 1st defendant's dealing with properties, as his own, which really belonged to the temple. It is difficult to see how this is not an allegation of fraud on the part of the 1st defendant for the effect of his action, if left undisturbed, would be to deprive the temple of some of its properties and would have given the 2nd defendant the right to bring those properties to sale in case of default as belonging to the 1st defendant personally. This element of fraud in the case, I think, differentiates it from Ottapurakkal Thazhate Soopi v. Cherichil Pallikkal Uppathumma 5 Ind. Cas. 698 : 33 M. 31. There are many subsequent cases in this Court, where, in case of fraud, it has been held that the right to sue accrues under Article 120 of the Limitation Act when the plaintiff becomes aware of the fraud. I may refer to two cases, Muruga Chetty v. Rajaswamy 30 Ind. Cas. 669 : 29 M.L.J. 574 : 2 L.W. 813 : 18 M.L.T. 327 : (1915) M.W.N. 701 and Thirumala Rao v. Kadakar Durgi Shettethe 22 Ind. Cas. 883 : 1 L.W. 134 : (1914) M.W.N. 197. Both these refer to cases of denial of plaintiff's title and it was held that until he was aware of that denial his right to sue did not accrue. It is difficult to distinguish cases of denial of title from one like the present which is in effect a denial by the 1st defendant of the temple's title to the property. Again in Venkataswara Aiyar v. Somasundram Chettiar 44 Ind. Cas. 551 : 7 L.W. 280 : (1916) M.W.N. 244 to which I was a party, it was held that, until a creditor became aware of the alienation which he attacked as being in fraud of creditors, his right to sue did not accrue. That, no doubt, was put upon the ground that a creditor has always an option as to whether he will or he will not avoid an alienation and that until he is in a position to exercise that option he cannot be said to have the right to sue. The case, therefore, though not entirely analogous to the present one, is in principle very similar. Here, the mere execution of a deed of alienation will not necessarily give the plaintiff the right to sue ; for if that deed was a valid one and the alienation was made for necessity or for other purposes which would render the transaction valid, plaintiff, if he brought a suit, would naturally be non-suited on the ground that he had no right to impeach the transaction and consequently no right to sue. It is only the fact that the alienation is attacked on the ground of fraud that really entitles the plaintiff to come into Court and impeach it. If there was no fraud he cannot impeach this alienation and, there fore, until he knows that there is such fraud it cannot be said that he has the right to bring a suit. It is certainly not open to him to bring a speculative suit alleging that something had happened which might or might not be avoidable, for, if that were the sole ground on which he sued he would naturally have his plaint rejected. Here he has alleged that he has become aware of it within six years of the suit, It will be seen in the Schedule of the Limitation Act that in cases of fraud the period of limitation usually starts from the time at which the fraud becomes known. Applying that principle here the plaintiff's suit is within time and this appeal must fail on that ground.
2. The further contention, that the properties mortgaged were not dedicated to the temple under the partition deed Ex. A cannot be supported in view of the language of the document in which it is recited that the suit properties were purchased by the plaintiff and the 1st defendant jointly and 'offered' to the aforesaid Swamivaru, namely, the plaint temple. The property itself, is not allotted to the 1st defendant for his share which it would have been had it been given to him as his own on the ground that he had incurred and must incur expenses in connection with the temple. This argument also fails and the appeal is accordingly dismissed with costs.
3. The learned Counsel of the appellant undertook to show that on the plaint itself there was a distinct bar of limitation. Now the plaint alleges that the defendant has alienated the properties dedicated to the temple, and that the plaintiff learns that the 1st defendant has mortgaged in 1914 temple properties as his own private properties. The learned Subordinate Judge has disallowed the plea of limitation which was only raised after all the evidence had been completed, on the ground that something more; than the mere allegation in the plaint Should be required to enable him to decide the matter. The question is whether he is right in this decision. It seems to me that as regards Article 120 of the Schedule of the limitation. Act, something is needed to give the plaint-ill notice as to when his right to sue accrues, because it would seem prima facie unreasonable that a man should lose his right to sue without ever knowing that he had one. It, therefore, appears to me, if I may say so with respect, that the reasons given by my learned brother in the case to which he was a party in Venkateswara Aiyar v. Somasundram Chettiar 44 Ind. Cas. 551 : 7 L.W. 280 : (1918) M.W.N. 244 are sound, i.e., where he points out that 'in all cases of fraud, misconduct, etc., the period of limitation for a suit begins to run from the time when the fraud, misconduct, etc., becomes known, (vide Articles 90, 91, 95, 96, etc.) but no such provision could be inserted in Article 120, for it is a residuary Article and thus applicable to every variety of suit not otherwise provided for and is not confined to suits based on fraud.' That seems to me to be an and to be perfectly true. In this case it seems to me that the suit is based on fraud or on a form of dishonesty which consisted in conveying as your own, properties that are not your own. It is suggested that that view is impossible because it must be fraud on the plaintiff before it can give him the right to sue, but the plaintiff is suing in a representative capacity on behalf of the worshippers of the temple and they are in effect complaining of the fraud of the 1st defendant in alienating these properties. If that view is correct it is impossible to say that the right to sue accrues before the plaintiff is aware of the fraudulent conveyance of the property. As my learned brother has pointed out a conveyance may be perfectly valid and may be undertaken for necessary and roost praiseworthy obligations, but the right to sue can accrue only when the plaintiff, representing' a body of worshippers, comes to know that the alienation was in effect in fraud of the temple. The case of Venkateswara Aiyer v. Somasundram Chettiar 44 Ind. Cas. 551 : 7 L.W. 280 : (1918) M.W.N. 244 is perhaps a stronger case than the present. In that case a creditor had an option as to whether he would seek to set aside an alienation or not but once he exercised his option, the case seems to me to be analogous to the present one. I would distinguish the case quoted from Ottapurakkal Thazhate Soopi v. Cherichil Pallikkal Uppathumma 5 Ind. Cas. 698 : 33 M. 31 on the same ground, namely, that there was no fraud alleged and, therefore, there was really nothing to come to the knowledge of the plaintiff. In Prasanna Venkatachella Reddiar v. Collector of Trichinopoly 33 Ind. Cas. 45 : 38 M. 1064 one of the learned Judges Spencer, J., decided the case on another ground, namely, the knowledge of the plaintiff more than six years before the date of the suit. I, therefore, think that Article 120 applies to the case, but that it will not apply until the plaintiff has had notice of the alienation. It is not disputed that if that is the case, the suit is within time. If this is so there is no doubt that the Subordinate Judge was right in thinking that the evidence would have to be gone into to show the truth or otherwise of the allegation of no lice. The learned Subordinate Judge was right in rejecting the plea of limitation and with regard to this point put forward in this appeal, I agree with my learned brother and would dismiss this appeal with costs.