A. Alagiriswami, J.
1. This writ petition is concerned with the effect and validity of Sub-rule (7) of Rule 6) of the Madras Co-operative Societies Rules, 1963. Under Section 91 of the Madras Co-operative Societies Act, 1961, the Registrar or any person subordinate to aim empowered by the Registrar in that behalf may, subject to the rules and without prejudice to any other mode of recovery provided by or under the Act, recover the various sums specified in Clauses (a) to (f) of that section, together with the interest, if any, due on such sum and the costs of process by the attachment and sale or by sale without attachment of the property of the person against whom such decree, decision, award or order, has been obtained or passed. Under Section 119 (2) (p) (iv) the Government have power to make rules for the enforcement of the decisions or awards in such proceedings and under Clause (ff) to prescribe the procedure for the attachment and sale of property under Section 91 of the Act. Rules have been made in pursuance of these powers and they are found in Chapter X of the Madras Co-operative Societies Rules, (1963), Rules 59 to 83 of those Rules. Rule 69 provides for application to set aside a sale on ground of irregularity or fraud, and corresponds to Order 21, Rule 90 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Under Section 96 of the Act, any parson aggrieved by any decision passed or order made under Section 91, may appeal to the Tribunal constituted under Section 95 of the Act, which in this case is the District Judge of the district concerned.
2. In this case the application made by the petitioner under Rule 69 was dismissed. The petitioner then filed a revision petition before the Registrar, apparently under Sub-rule (7) of Rule 69. The Registrar rejected it, holding that he had no revisional jurisdiction in the matter. Thereupon, the petitioner filed an appeal to the Tribunal under Section 96 and the Tribunal has rejected it holding that it had no jurisdiction to entertain an appeal in the matter. This writ petition is filed to quash the order of the Tribunal.
3. It appears to me that the Tribunal has jurisdiction to entertain the appeal and the Registrar does not have the power to revise under Section 97 of the Act. The reference in Section 91 of the recovery being' subject to the rules' does not mean that any Rules made under the provisions of Section 119 already referred to, can have the effect of whittling down the powers conferred on the Tribunal under Section 96. Section 96 does not say that the power to entertain appeals against the decisions or orders made under Section 91 are subject to any Rules made under any of the provisions of the Act. Indeed, even if any rule were permitted to be made under Section 96, they can only relate to the procedure with regard to the entertaining and hearing of appeals and cannot take away the power of appeal given under that section in respect of matters covered by Section 91. Similarly rules contemplated under (the) section can only relate to the procedure of recovery and cannot relate to appeals which are provided for under Section 96. All rules made under an Act should be consistent with the provisions of the Act and advantage cannot be taken of the wide language in which the rule-making power is worded, to contend that such rules can be made even if they are inconsistent with any part of the Act. All the sections of an Act as well as the Rules made under the Act must be read together and interpreted consistently with each other and if this principle of interpretation is kept in mind, there can be no room for the argument that a rule can be made which takes away the power conferred by a section of the Act. There have been cases where it has been held that Rules can be made conferring powers on certain Bodies or Tribunals, on the ground that they are intended to carry out the purposes of the Act even though no specific rule-making power permitting such rules being made are found in the Act. But that is different from saying that a rule can be made which takes away the power granted under a section of the Act.
4. Under Order 21 of the Code of Civil Procedure, only orders passed under certain of the rules in that Order are made appealable. The result of my conclusion in this case would be that all orders made under Chapter X of the Madras Co-operative Societies Rules, 1963, would be subject to appeal under Section 96 of the Act. That no doubt, might throw a heavy burden on the Tribunal, but that cannot be helped. It is a matter for the Legislature to deal with. The reference to Section 97 in Sub-rule (7) of Rule 69, seems to have been merely copied from the old Rules made under the Madras Co-operative Societies Act, 1932, under Rule 22 (10) (V-a) of which an order made under that sub-rule was, subject only to the provisions of Section 57 of that Act, final. Section 97 of the present Act corresponds to Section 57 of the old Act. But, under the old Act there was no provision for an appeal to the Tribunal. Without bestowing sufficient attention to this aspect, the old Rule 22 (10) (v-a) has been copied as the present Rule 69 (7), merely substituting reference to Section 97 of the present Act in place of the reference to Section 57 of the old Act. I am satisfied that Rule 69 (7) should be deemed to be held to be beyond the rule-making power conferred on the Government under the provisions of Section 119 of the Act already referred to. It should, therefore, be held that the powers of the Tribunal under Section 96 of the Act have not been and cannot be whittled down in any way. The result of this conclusion is that the Tribunal has got to hear the appeal. Of course, it is open to the respondents to raise whatever relevant contentions are available to them regarding the merits of the appeal, including the question whether the appeal is in time. The decision in this writ petition is only that the Tribunal has jurisdiction to hear the appeal and has therefore a duty to hear it. Ordered accordingly. No order as to costs.
5. I must thank Mr. Ramanujam, the learned Government Pleader, who was not interested in the matter directly but helped the Court with his arguments as also Mr. R.G. Rajan, who argued the case fairly. It goes without saying that due credit should be given to Mr. Palaniswami who argued the case for the petitioner with considerable ability.