G. Ramanujam, J.
1. The tenants are the petitioners herein. The landlords who are the same in both the cases filed eviction petitions against them on the ground that the building is bona fide required for demolition and reconstruction. The eviction petitions were resisted by the petitioners on two grounds: (1) that the respondent's requirement is not bona Me and (2) that the notice terminating the tenancy in this case is defective and as such, the tenancies have not been duly terminated as per law. The Rent Controller as well as the appellate authority have rejected the defence put forward by the petitioner and ordered eviction holding that the tenancies have been duly terminated and that the requirement of the landlord of the premises for the purposes of demolition and reconstruction was quite bona fide.
2. In these revision, the learned Counsel for the petitioners urges the same two contentions as were urged before the Courts below. On the question of bona fide requirement, the petitioner contends that the notice issued just prior to the filing of the eviction petition by the respondents required the premises for their own occupation, a purpose which is inconsistent with the purpose for which the eviction is sought and that the respondents have not shown their bona fides by obtaining the sanction of the Municipality for demolition and reconstruction of the building. It is seen from the evidence that Exhibit P-4 dated 2nd May, 1967, issued just before the filing of the eviction petition terminated the tenancy and called upon the petitioners to deliver vacant possession on the ground that the building was required for respondents' own occupation. But the eviction petitions have been filed on the ground that they require the premises for demolition and reconstruction. This variation in the purpose for which the building is required is said to be inconsistent showing the absence of bona fides in the requirement of the respondents. I am not inclined to agree with the learned Counsel for the petitioners that the purposes mentioned in the notice and the eviction petition were inconsistent. P.W. 1 in his deposition before the Rent Controller had stated that after issuing the notice stating that they required the premises for their own occupation, he went and inspected the building and it was felt that the building was in such a bad state of repair that it is desirable to demolish and reconstruct. This explanation given by P.W. 1 sufficiently explains as to why the purpose mentioned in the eviction petition is different from the one mentioned in the notice, Exhibit P-4. Similarly P.W. 1 also explains as to how he offered to give a portion of the premises after reconstruction to the petitioners at the time of the enquiry before the Rent Controller. He states that the building to be reconstructed is a multi-storeyed building and it is possible to give portion of the said building to the petitioners even after the respondents occupy some of the portions. Hence the contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioners that the offer made by the respondent to give portions of tire building after demolition and reconstruction to the petitioners, while their notice mentioned the purpose of eviction as one for owners' occupation shows absence of good faith cannot be accepted. I therefore, hold agreeing with the Courts below that the requirement of the building by the landlords for demolition and reconstruction is bona fide.
3. It is also seen that the respondents have applied for sanction of the plan which is awaited. It cannot be said that in all cases whenever an application for demolition and reconstruction is made, a prior sanction of the Municipality should have been obtained. Madras Act XVIII of 1960 nowhere provides that a petition for demolition and reconstruction should be made only after getting the required sanction from the Municipality. The respondents have already applied for the sanction from the Municipality and that shows that they have taken all preliminary steps for the purpose of demolition and reconstruction and that is sufficient to show their bona fides.
4. The other contention put forward by the petitioners that the notice terminating the tenancy was bad in law is also, in my view, equally without substance. What the learned Counsel states is that the notice Exhibit P-4, terminating the tenancy mentions that the respondents require the building for their own occupation. But the petitions for eviction have been filed on a different ground and that, therefore, the notice terminating the tenancy which gives a different ground than the one set out in the eviction petitions should be treated as an invalid notice. It is not possible to accept this contention, for the tenancy is determined by a notice to quit under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, and not under the provisions of the Madras Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960. As a matter of fact Madras Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960, does not make a notice to quit a condition for filing a petition for eviction. It is only by virtue of the judicial decisions holding that a tenant cannot be evicted from the leasehold premises under the provisions of the Act unless the tenancy is duly determined as per law, a notice terminating the tenancy is insisted upon before entertaining any petition for eviction. Hence the validity of the notice terminating the tenancy should be decided under the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act, and not by its comparison with the purpose mentioned in the eviction petition.
5. The learned Counsel for the petitioner seeks reliance from the dissenting judgment of Mookerjee, J., in Surya Properties (P.) Ltd. v. Bimalendu Math : AIR1964Cal1 , holding that on a reasonable construction of Section 13 (6) and 23 of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956, the grounds on which eviction is sought for have to be specifically stated and that the notice terminating the tenancy should contain the same ground as is mentioned in the eviction petition. With due respect it is not possible to adopt the reasoning of the learned Judge in that case for two reasons. Firstly, Section 13(6) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, specifically provided for a notice before an eviction petition is filed and the notice dealt with by the learned Judge in that case was one issued under that Act and not under the Transfer of Property Act. It goes without saying that the purpose mentioned in the notice issued under that Act preceding the eviction petition and the purpose mentioned in the eviction petition should be the same. The notice in the cases on hand has been issued not under the provisions of the Madras Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960, but under the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act. It is settled law that a notice to quit issued under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, need not be on any ground whatever. Secondly, the majority decision had held that as the notice contemplated under Section 13(6) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956, was essentially a notice of suit, such a notice may be combined with a notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, that it is not necessary to mention in the notice under Section 13(6), the ground or grounds of ejectment for which a suit is to be instituted for recovery of possession, and that a notice issued under Section 13(6) without stating the grounds of ejectment will be nonetheless valid. Hence it is not possible to accept the contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioners that the notice, Exhibit P-4, having given a different purpose should be held to be bad in law.
6. As the petitioners have failed in all their submissions, the civil revision petition is dismissed. There will, however, be no order as to costs. Time for vacating four months.