This second appeal has arisen from a revenue suit which was filed in the Special Deputy Collector's Court of Ramnad at Manamadura. It has been previously presented to the Subordinate Judge's Court of Ramnad as a Small Cause suit, but was returned by the Small Cause Judge to be presented to the Original Side in the District Munsif's Court and thereupon it was presented to the District Munsif's Court of Manamadura and was returned by him in turn to be presented to a Revenue Court on the ground that the claim related to rent due in respect of an estate. On the face of the plaint it is perfectly clear that the plaintiff landholder set up that only defendants Nos. 1 to 3 were the ryots of the land and, therefore, liable to him for rent. In para. 7 of the plaint this is what the plaintiff has stated. 'Though the kudivaram in the suit land belongs only to defendants Nos. 1 to 3 all the defendants in this suit have joined together, ploughed this land and done Cultivation etc., and are enjoying the whole produce from the year Ananda. It is clear, therefore, that the other defendants, namely, defendants' Nos. 4 to 9 were impleaded, namely, as trespassers. The suit was clearly not cognisable by a Revenue Court as against these trespassers because the jurisdiction of the Revenue Court as a Summary Court is only in respect of claim by the landholder against the ryot. See the general observations in the case of Rajah of Venkatagiri v. Jayampu Ayappa Reddi : (1913)25MLJ578 . The trial Court dismissed the suit. But on appeal a decree has been passed by the lower Appellate Court against all the defendants including defendants Nos. 4 to 9. Only defendants Nos. 5 to 9 have preferred this second appeal and it appears that the 4th defendant died in ths mean time. On this appeal the point has been taken that the Court had no jurisdiction to entertain a suit against defendants Nos. 4 to 9 more especially when according to the allegation in the plaint, itself, they were impleaded not as ryots but as trespassers. Of course, when the question of jurisdiction is raised with regard to a suit as framed, the jurisdiction will relate to the entire suit, but defendants Nos. 1 to 3 have not preferred any appeal to this Court; and, at this stage, we do not deem it necessary to disturb the decree passed so far as they are concerned. But, at any rate, if the trial Court found at any stage that the persons who were ryots set up jus tertii the proper procedure to follow would have been that laid down and indicated in Section 194 of the Madras Estates Land Act. It is to be regretted that this course was not pursued. However, as the question of jurisdiction has now been raised, it seems to us that that question must be found for the appellants. As the appellants were never alleged to be ryots of the land or tenants of the plaintiff, the suit, so far as they were concerned, was improperly instituted in a Revenue Court. The Revenue Court had no jurisdiction to try or determine any of the questions that arose aB between the plaintiff and the defendants Nos. 4 to 9 and, therefore, the Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit as against them. On the whole, however, the proper order we think fit to pass at present is that, so far as defendants Nos. 4 to 9 are concerned, the suit must be dismissed. There will be no order as to their costs in any Court. The appeal is, therefore, allowed and the decree passed by the lower Appellate Court will be modified by excluding the liability of defendants Nos. 4 to 9 therefrom and confining the decree only to defendants Nos. 1 to 3 in the suit.