1. Appellants' Vakil has no instructions. The appeal is dismissed with costs of respondents Nos. 2 to 6. (Costs of papers in Appeal No. 279 of 1920 to be included).
In A.S. Nos. 279 and 280 or 1920.
2. Respondents' Vakil reports no instructions and withdraws from the care which, is therefore, heard ex parte.
3. The question of limitation is first argved and on that we think appellant must succeed.
4. The suit is to set aside a revenue tale and limitation is governed by Article 12(b) of Schedule I of the Limitation Act. This allows one year from the time when the sale is confirmed or would otherwise have become final and conclusive. There is no provision in the Estates land Act similar to one in the Civil Procedure Code Order XXI, Rule 92, for confirmation of sale and for the. sale thereupon becoming absolute, and consequently the second clause of Article 12(b) of the Limitation Act must be applied.
5. Section 124 (2) of the Madras Estates Land Act provides that on payment of the purchase-money and on the expiration of 30 days the Court shall, if no application has been made to set aside the sale under Section 131, or if such application has been made and rejected, grant a certificate of sale to the purchaser, stating the property sold, the name of the purchaser, and the date of Sale. From this it is clear that such a sale would become final in the absence of any application under Section 131, Estates Land Act, 30 days after the date of sale. This suit was brought more than one year after such date in the present case and is, therefore, barred by limitation. We are supported in this conclusion by the decision in Kamppa Thevan v. Vasudeva Sastri 6 M. 148 : 7 Ind. Jur. 13 : 2 Ind. Dec. 382. This was under tie Mcdrp.s Act 11 of 1804 in which Section 38 provides that the Collector shall make an order confirming the sale. The abserce of this provision in the Estates Land Act makes the present case so much the stronger. We may also refer to Bhutan Mohun Maitra v. Grirish Narain Moonshi 10 Ind. Cas. 87 : 13 CRI.L.J. 339 where a similar view prevailed. In Appeal No. 280 of 1020 there is an allegation in the plaint that a petition was put in by plaintiff to set aside the sale, but Ex. F. shows that this application was really a suit Under Section 112 and not an application under Section 131. The appeals are accordingly allowed and plaintiff's suit dismissed with costs throughout.