1. Appeal from the order of the Additional Subordinate Judge of Tinnevelly in A.S. No. 99 of 1920, against the order of the Additional District Munsif of Tinnevelly, in E.P. No. 153 of 1918.
2. In Original Suit No. 97 of 1906, plaintiffs had sued for recovery of certain items and obtained possession of certain items in the course of the litigation. Defendants obtained re-delivery and plaintiffs while appealing to the High Court for the cancellation of that order, applied for an injunction restraining defendants from cutting trees. This was granted on the condition that if the appeal failed, plaintiffs would be liable to defendants for the profits of which the injunction deprived them. The appeal was dismissed and the defendants have applied in these proceedings for their profits. The District. Munsif dismissed the application; but the Subordinate Judge allowed it on appeal assessing mesne profits at Rs. 310. Hence this appeal.
3. Appellants contend that Section 144 has no application to the facts of this case and' defendant's remedy lies, if at all, by way of suit. It is a well-accepted proposition that Courts have a general power, or rather duty to see that no party suffers from their own acts. This principle is fully enunciated by the Judicial Committee in Jai Berham v. Kedar Nath A.I.R. 1922 P.C. 269. Compare also Allah Din v. Chirragh Din (1921) 63 I.C. 43 'there is no doubt that the Courts have inherent power under Section 151 to apply the principle of Section 144 to cases which are not strictly within its terms and to order such restitution as may become necessary as the result of their own orders.' Their own orders as explained in the Privy Council case quoted above, mean any order of any Court, which has entertained jurisdiction over the matter.
4. In these circumstances, I 80 not find that the lower appellate Court erred in eatertaining an application for restitution, and dismiss the appeal with costs.