1. There can be no doubt that appellant has wilfully disobeyed the orders of the District Court. On 10th October 1922 he was directed to invest the minor's money in approved securities. Instead of doing so, he lent it out on pro-notes and did not inform the Court that he has done so until he was called to account over a year later. The excuse that on 11th October 1922 he was not a proper guardian, as he had not given security, carries no weight. The, Court then pointed out to him his duty, whether as guardian de facto or as guardian de jure and he has not done his duty. Since then, he has at various times been ordered by the District Court to realize and deposit those moneys in that Court. The earliest of these orders was on 29th October 1924. Admittedly he has taken no steps to realize the money on the pro-notes and is now no nearer doing so than he was then. He pleads that owing to tightness in the money market his promisors cannot pay at present. He has taken no steps to compel them to pay.
2. Nor is the appropriate remedy for such conduct action under Section 45(1) which the lower Court has taken. Is it a case to which that section is applicable The lower Court has brought the case under Section 45 (1)(b) as failure to exhibit accounts in compliance with a requisition under Section 31(e) and to pay into Court the balance due on those accounts in compliance with a requisition under Section 34(d)(3).
3. The appellant's contention is that Section 34(d) is limited to such balance as his accounts show to be in his hands and not moneys invested and in the hands of others. The respondent does not go so far as to centend that Section 34(d) authorizes a Court to compel a guardian peremptorily, to realize all investments of the minor's money and produce the cash bud he does contend that it authorises the Court to compel such immediate realization and production of cash or production of the whole cash anyhow by the guardian, whether or no he can at once realize the investments in cases where the investments have been made in defiance of the orders of the Court.
4. It is clear to our minds that when, say, a guardian's accounts are in the shape of so much invested in approved securities and so much in cash, the balance due from him on those accounts would naturally be the amount of cash in his hands. We are unable to see that the interpretation of that phrase should mean anything different: when the investments are in securities, but not in approved securities, even when the investment was in defiance of the orders of the Court. No more cash than is in the hands of the guardian would have been in his hands if he had obeyed the orders of the Court, and it is only cash that ought to be in his hands that the Court can at most under Section 34 compel him, on pain of punishment under Section 45, to produce. In other words the Court cannot in this case say to him 'if you had obeyed my orders you would have had more cash to produce,' because that would not be true. The test, to our minds, is what cash should the guardian have had, if he had followed the Court's directions, and it is such cash and such only that the Court can under Section 34 compel him to produce.
5. Authority on this point is scanty. Our attention has been called to two rulings-of the Calcutta High Court Jagannath Panja v. Mahesh Chandra  25 C.L.J. 149; and In re Nikhrannessa Bibi 20 C.W.N. 663. In both cases the Court proceeded on the accounts filed by the guardians, and called on them to produce only such cash as those accounts showed to be in their hands.
6. A Bench of the Allahabad High Court has dissented from the Calcutta view in Sita Ram v. Gobindi A.I.R. 1924 All. 593 and laid down that the Court is not bound to accept the balance shown on the guardian's accounts, but may revise it by striking out payments which appear to it improper. The finding of fact in that case was that a sum of Rs. 900 alleged by the guardian to have been spent had not been spent on behalf of the minors, and the High Court, in arriving at the balance of cash which the guardian ought to have had, added that item. The case is not on all fours with the present.
7. Here the investments attacked are for the minor and enure from him. It was the guardian's duty in obedience to the order of the Court dated 11th October 1922 to invest the money now tied up in the pro-notes in approved securities. For this purpose it was unnecessary for the Court to order him on 27th October 1924: to realize the investments and deposit the actual cash, and that order, we have already held, was not an order under Section 34(e) and (d).
8. We are given to understand that the promisors of the pro-notes are willing to convert their obligations into first mortgages on immovable property. If this-is true, the intention of the District Court in its order of 11th October 1922 is fulfilled.
9. We are of opinion that the order under appeal is ultra vires. We, therefore, set it aside. Two months' time from to day will be given to appellant, to have the pro-note replaced; by first mortgages. If this is not done the District Court will take steps to remove the appellant from his guardianship and to have the secuity bond enforced against-him and the sureties. We make no order as to costs.
10. The fine, if paid, should be refunded.