Skip to content


Sivarama Aiyar Vs. Ahilambal Ammal - Court Judgment

LegalCrystal Citation
SubjectProperty ;Civil
CourtChennai
Decided On
Judge
Reported inAIR1938Mad153; 175Ind.Cas.704; (1937)2MLJ789
AppellantSivarama Aiyar
RespondentAhilambal Ammal
Excerpt:
civil procedure code (act v of 1908), order xxxih, rule 9 - applicability--pauper plaintiff entering into-agreement with another and agreeing to repay advances made and to be made for conduct of litigation, or on default, agreeing to sell share of property, the subject-matter in litigation--agreement, if covered by rule 9--plaintiff held should be dispaupered. - .....the ground of his having entered into an agreement with one manickatn pillai with reference to the subject-matter of the suit. the execution of the agreement was admitted, but it was alleged that the agreement was neither in respect of the subject-matter of the suit, nor had any person obtained an interest in such subject-matter. after the agreement was produced by manickam piilai, the plaintiff alleged subsequently that the agreement was altered in material particulars after its execution, and that he did not know of such alteration until it was produced in court. after recording evidence in the proceedings, the learned subordinate judge found it as a fact that the agreement was not altered. the petitioner now asked me to interfere with this finding on the ground that it is erroneous......
Judgment:
ORDER

Abdur Rahman, J.

1. This is a Civil Revision Petition against an order of the Principal Subordinate Judge of Trichinopoly dispaupering the plaintiff, under Order XXXIII, Rule 9, Civil Procedure Code, on the ground of his having entered into an agreement with one Manickatn Pillai with reference to the subject-matter of the suit. The execution of the agreement was admitted, but it was alleged that the agreement was neither in respect of the subject-matter of the suit, nor had any person obtained an interest in such subject-matter. After the agreement was produced by Manickam Piilai, the plaintiff alleged subsequently that the agreement was altered in material particulars after its execution, and that he did not know of such alteration until it was produced in Court. After recording evidence in the proceedings, the learned Subordinate Judge found it as a fact that the agreement was not altered. The petitioner now asked me to interfere with this finding on the ground that it is erroneous. After hearing his Counsel's arguments, who led me through the evidence, I and myself in agreement with the finding of the Court below. Even if I had not arrived at the same conclusion, J. would not have been entitled to interfere with it. The lower Court was entitled to come to a finding, and having determined the question of fact against the petitioner, it cannot be said to have acted either illegally or with any material irregularity. It is thus clear that this ground is neither correct nor open to the petitioner in revision.

2. It was then contended on behalf of the petitioner that even if the agreement was accepted as genuine, it did not create any right in the subject-matter of the suit. A reference was made by his Counsel to Section 51, Transfer of Property Act, and Section 17, Registration Act, which was in my opinion wholly irrelevant in this case. Under the terms of the present agreement, Manickam Piilai had advanced a sum of Rs. 500 to the petitioner towards the expenses already incurred by him in conducting the suit till then and had also agreed to advance another sum of Rs. 500 'for taking steps and for the expenses that may be necessary hereafter till the disposal of the suit in the Sub-Court, Trichmopoly.' The petitioner had in consideration of the advances so made, and promised to be made subsequently, agreed to re-pay the amount of Rs. 1,000 with interest within three months of the disposal of the suit. He had further undertaken to sell one-fourth share of the properties to which he might be held entitled if he failed to re pay the money due from him within the time mentioned above.

3. An agreement of this nature doe fall in my opinion within the language of Order XXXIII, Rule 9(c) which is wide enough to cover such an interest as was created by the petitioner in Manickam Pillai's favour. Moreover, as observed by Mullick, (sic) Charu Sila Dasi v Haran Chandra Mukherjee 50 Ind. Cas. 520 : 50 Ind. Cas. 520 : A.I.R. 1919 Pat. 58, the provisions Contained in Order XXXIII, Civil Procedure Code, were designed in aid of bona fide litigants and must be strictly confined to them. With this observation of the learned Judge I respectfully agree. I would therefore reject the petition for revision with costs. The petitioner's Counsel asked me in the end that if his petition was not to be accepted, I might grant him further time to pay the necessary court-fees. The Court has power to do so under Section 149, Civil Procedure Code, and in view of the fact that the lower Court had also granted him a month to pay the requisite court-fees of which be could not avail himself on account of this petition having been filed and admitted, I would accede to this request and order the petitioner to pay the necessary court-fee within a fortnight from this date.


Save Judgments// Add Notes // Store Search Result sets // Organizer Client Files //