Ganapatia Pillai, J.
1. This revision is directed against an order of the Appellate Authority under the House Rent Control Act by which a decision of the Rent Controller was set aside and the petition for eviction was remanded to the Rent Controller for trial afresh. The counsel for the petitioner contends that power of remand is not conferred upon the Appellate Authority by the Act (Act XVIII of 1960) and, in support of that contention, he refers to the language of Section 23 of the Act. The relevant Sub-section (3) of that section reads:
The Appellate Authority shall call for the records of the case from the Controller and after giving the parties an opportunity of being heard, and if necessary after making such further inquiry as he thinks fit either personally or through the Controller, shall decide the appeal.
True, explicitly power of remand is not conferred upon the Appellate Authority by the terms of this section. In support of this contention, the counsel also relies upon a Bench Decision of this Court in Rangaswami Naidu v. Second Judge, Small Cause Court, Madras 62 L.W. (Jour.) 35. There the question was whether the appellate authority under Madras Act XV of 1946 had not got all the ordinary powers of the Appellate Court under the Civil Procedure Code, and if on finding that the material on record was not sufficient the appellate court could remand the case for fresh disposal by the Rent Controller. The Bench answered this question in the negative. That is what has happened in this case. Eviction was sought by the landlord on the ground that the portion of the premises in the occupation of the landlord was insufficient for his needs, as his family consisted of nine members and the portion in his occupation consisted of one room and one verandah, and that he needed the portion occupied by the tenant for his own occupation. One of the grounds on which the Rent Controller held against the landlord was that the prior applications by the grandmother of the petitioner before me was dismissed. He relied upon this circumstance to conclude that the request for eviction was not bona fide, though he also incidentally referred to the absence of evidence on the question as to the requirements of the landlord for occupation. This is not a case. where it could be said that the order of dismissal was set aside and a fresh inquiry was directed merely on the ground that the material on record was not sufficient to justify the findings. Counsel for the respondent referred to a decision of Ramachandra Iyer, C.J. in Dhanakoti Chettiar v. Duraiswami Chettiar : (1962)2MLJ82 that even a revisional Court under Madras Act XVIII of 1960 had implied power to remand a proceeding for re-hearing or setting aside an order of the trial Court. Section 25 of that Act is no doubt wider in language than the section I am concerned with here; but the principle applicable is the same, namely, where the ground, on which an appellate Court or revisional Court sets aside an order of the trial Court, is the only ground upon which the order of the trial Court is founded, an opportunity should necessarily be given to the parties to let in evidence upon other grounds available and relevant to the point in issue.
2. The Civil Revision Petition is therefore dismissed. No costs.