1. On the first question-as to the date of the 1st respondent's (R. Subramania Iyer's) birth--we see no reason to differ from the Court below. On the next, whether, on the terms of the decree, the respondent should not furnish security, we think that the intention was that the minor's next friend should furnish security. He could not do so himself. Now that he is a major, no security is necessary. Apart from that, the decree provides that security should be furnished only if the amount was paid by a certain date. The only remaining question is whether the respondent was entitled to the benefit of Section 4 of the Limitation Act. Two Madras Oases have been cited. The first is, Narasimha Deo Garu v. Krishnachandra Deo Garu 52 Ind. Cas. 725 : 37 M.L.J. 256 : (1919) M.W.N. 440 : 10 L.W. 156. It floes not consider the applicability of Section 4 of the Act. The other is Marri Narasayya v. Peruri Krishnamurthi : AIR1928Mad1255 . It is directly in point and we propose to follow it. What Section 4 says is that, if the time for presenting an application expires while a Court is closed, the applicant may present it to the Court on the date when it opens again. The date of presentation goes back to the day when it ought to have been but could not be presented. The appeal is dismissed with costs.