Sadasiva Aiyar, J.
1. Though this appeal is described in the memorandum of the appeal grounds as an appeal against the decree and judgment passed by the Temporary Subordinate Judge, the learned Vakil for the appellant has requested us to treat it as an appeal against only the order passed by the lower Court directing the arbitrator's award to be Sled under Schedule II, paragraph 21 Clause (I), Civil procedure Code corresponding to old Section 526).
2. Schedule II, paragraph 21, Clause (1), is as follows;--'Where the Court is satisfied that the matter has been referred to arbitration, and that an award has been made thereon, and where no ground such as is mentioned or referred to in paragraph 14 or paragraph 15 is proved, the Court shall order the award to be filed and shall proceed to pronounce judgment according to the award.'
3. Mr. C.S. Venkatachariar for the appellant first argued that other grounds than those mentioned in paragraphs 14 and 15 might also be advanced against the filing of the award. Reading paragraph 21(1) in its ordinary sense, it seems to us clear that the Court is bound to file the award when three conditions are fulfilled, namely, (a) the Court being satisfied that the matter has been referred to arbitration,(b) the Court being satisfied that an award has been made thereon and (c) no ground mentioned in paragraphs 14 and 15 being proved against the award. If so, to refuse to file the award on other grounds seems to be clearly against the provisions of the section.
4. Mr. Venkatachariar, however, relied on observations found in certain decisions given under Section 526 of the old Code. Two of the decisions he relied on are reported as Amrit Ram v. Dasrat Ram 17 A.s 21 and Chintamallayya v. Thadi Gangireddi 20 M.s 89. The point directly decided in those cases was that though the two conditions (a) and (b) above referred to in Schedule II, paragraph 21, were not found in Section 526 of the old Code, the Court was entitled to refuse to file the award if those two conditions are not fulfilled. The very general observations found in those cases that other grounds than those mentioned in Sections 520 and 521 of the old Code (corresponding to present paragraphs 14 and 15) can also form grounds for refusing to file the award should, in my opinion, be read as qualified by the particular objections treated as valid in those cases. Anyhow, the new Code having fixed the conditions clearly and reasonably, I do not think that the Courts can refuse to file awards by imposing further conditions than the three mentioned in paragraph 21 against the imperative words of the Statute Law.
5. In the present case, the conditions (a) and (b) have admittedly been fulfilled. The only objection to the filing of the award available to the appellants, therefore, is that one or more of the grounds mentioned in paragraphs 14 and 15 is or are available to him.
6. Paragraphs 14 and 15 together contain six grounds of objections to an award. So far as the three grounds mentioned in paragraph 15 are concerned, it is admitted that no such grounds were put forward in the lower Court.
7. As regards the three heads of objections mentioned in paragraph 14, though the counter-petition put in by the defendant (appellant) in the lower Court vaguely mentions one or two of the said grounds, it appears from the judgment of the Subordinate Judge that only two objections were argued before him and those two objections form the subject of two issues raised at the trial, namely, (1) 'Whether the award is illegal as the reference leading to it was made in the pendency of Original Suit No 75 of 1913 on the file of this Court.' (2) 'Whether everything that is to be done under the award has been performed by the defendant and so it cannot be filed in Court.'
8. As regards the first contention, it must be decided against the appellant on the strength of the decision in Nanjappa v. Nanja Rao 16 Ind. Cas. 478. As regards the second contention, the performance of the obligations imposed by the award on the defendant between the date of the award and the date of the application to file the award is not one of the three grounds mentioned in paragraph 14 as available for attacking the award.
9. It may be a question whether, if the defendant had really fulfilled the obligations, as alleged by him, that would be a valid defence to an application of the plaintiff for execution of the decree passed on the award. Though there are several decisions [see Rukmani Ammal v. Krishnamachary (1910) M.W.N. 798; Laldas Narandas v. Kishordas Devidas 22 B.k 463; Rajab Ali Chowdhury v. Hadayet Ali Chowdhury 22 C.L.J. 197; Krishnamachariar v. Rukmani Ammal 15 M.L.J. 370 and Subramania Pillai v. Kumaravelu Ambalam 33 Ind. Cas. 66 holding that the facts of a particular kind, even if they had taken place before the passing of the decree in a suit, could be set up by the judgment-debtor as a plea in bar to the execution of the decree, I feel (with the greatest respect) grave doubts as to the soundness of those decisions and I am inclined to follow, what appears to me, the very cogent reasoning found in the case of Chenvirappa v. Puttappa 11 B.k 708 decided by West and Bird wood, JJ.
10. However, the defendant would not even then be without a remedy for recovering back any sums which he has paid between the date of the award and the date of the application for filing the award and paying regard to the imperative terms of Schedule II, paragraph 21, I think the lower Court was right in filing the award. I would, therefore, dismiss the appeal with costs.
11. The connected civil revision petition is dismissed.
12. I agree.