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P. Arunachala Aiyar and ors. Vs. Collector of Tanjore - Court Judgment

LegalCrystal Citation
SubjectCivil
CourtChennai
Decided On
Reported inAIR1926Mad961
AppellantP. Arunachala Aiyar and ors.
RespondentCollector of Tanjore
Cases ReferredEzra v. Secretary of State
Excerpt:
.....criminal case, can still be considered as disqualified for selection to the police service of the state and that the same cannot be termed as disqualified for selection to the police service of the state and that the same cannot be termed as illegal or unjustified. the reason as to why cr.p.c. does not make a distinction between an acquittal on benefit of doubt and an honourable acquittal, is to ensure that no person shall be tried for a second time for the same offence for which he is tried and convicted or acquitted once. what is provided under section 300(1) of cr.p.c. is only a reassurance of the constitutional right guaranteed under article 20(2). the principle behind this prescription under section 300 of cr.p.c. is to avoid double jeopardy to a person. if the code recognizes such..........the ground that he has not discussed the evidence in the case, but has relied on the award of the acquisition officer. the contention here is that the statements in the award, such as statements as to contents of certain documents examined by the acquisition officer are not evidence, but must be proved by the production of the documents themselves. so far as the adequacy of the judgment is concerned, it must be observed that the judge appears to have disposed of the reference as if he were hearing objections to an award as specified in the act and accordingly he has dealt with the evidence adduced to support those objections and has not dealt with the evidence relied on by the acquisition officer which was not specifically impeached. appellant's contention is supported by an observation.....
Judgment:

1. This is an appeal against an award in land acquisition proceedings. The first objection taken is, that the judgment of the District Judge is inadequate on the ground that he has not discussed the evidence in the case, but has relied on the award of the acquisition officer. The contention here is that the statements in the award, such as statements as to contents of certain documents examined by the acquisition officer are not evidence, but must be proved by the production of the documents themselves. So far as the adequacy of the judgment is concerned, it must be observed that the Judge appears to have disposed of the reference as if he were hearing objections to an award as specified in the Act and accordingly he has dealt with the evidence adduced to support those objections and has not dealt with the evidence relied on by the acquisition officer which was not specifically impeached. Appellant's contention is supported by an observation in Bommadevara Venkata v. Atmari Subbarayudu [1913] 36 Mad. 395 in which it was said that proceedings under part 3 of the Act are not by way of appeal but that observation must be taken in connexion with the facts of that case. It was a case relating to proceedings under Section 30 of the Act and under that section undoubtedly there is no question of an appeal. In Marwadi Padmaji Maichand v. Dy. Collector of Adoni [1927] 27 M.L.J. 106 it was pointed out that the burden of proof is on the claimant to show that the award is wrong and the weight of that burden depends on the nature of the award. That the award can be looked at by the District Judge in references of this kind is clear from the provisions of the Act. Section 12 says that such an award shall except as hereinafter provided be final and conclusive evidence as between the Collector and the person interested as to the true value of the land. If it is final and conclusive evidence in certain circumstances, it can be hardly said that it is no evidence at all in other circumstances namely, when a reference has been made to the District Court under Section 18. This is also clear from Section 18 itself which deals with these references, for it provides in Clause2, that the application shall state the grounds on which objection to the award is taken and under Section 21 the scope of the inquiry shall be restricted to a consideration of the interests of the persons affected by the objection.

2. Thus it appears that what the District Court has to consider is the objection raised by a claimant to the award, and the claimant is bound to state the grounds for such objection. In this respect the procedure is similar to an appeal in a suit where the appellant has to state in his memorandum of appeal the grounds on which he objects to the lower Court's judgment. The Privy Council decision in Ezra v. Secretary of State for India [1905] 32 Cal. 605 can have no bearing on the, present case. In that their Lordships were dealing with a suit and not with proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act. If the District Judge's judgment is looked at in that light, it appears that he has dealt with the evidence put forward by the claimant in support of the objections, namely, the sale-deeds which had already been inspected by the acquisition officer. The acquisition officer has given reasons for not accepting the sale deeds as conclusive, chiefly on the grounds that there are other sale-deeds which give a fairer estimate of the market value of similar lands. That being so, the award of the acquisition officer has to be considered and in that he has given very good reasons for coming to his conclusions and nothing put forward by the claimants in appeal destroys the validity of his arguments. We, therefore, are unable to say that the compensation awarded is inadequate and certainly there can be no doubt that the claimants have been very extravagant in their demands. It is also noticeable that the present applicants own only one quarter of the land acquired and that other owners have all acquiesced in the compensation awarded. In those circumstances the rate of compensation must be accepted.

3. There remains only one question, viz., the value of the trees. The appellants state that the value has been awarded to the wrong persona. Apart from the fact these persons are not now before us, and if we had to give a decision on the point, it would be necessary to give them notice before deciding. It is conceded by the appellant's vakil that the materials before us are entirely inadequate to deal with the question. He is unable to point out to whom the compensation has actually been, awarded and in respect of how many trees. In these circumstances it is impossible to consider this ground of appeal, for there are no available data on which a decision can be arrived at. This objection also fails.

4. Consequently the appeal is dismissed with costs.


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