T. Ramaprasada Rao, C.J.
1. In petition filed by the tenants who secured the benefits under the City Tenants' Protection Act for a direction to the landlords to convey the land to them as per the directions of the principal Court which went into the matter regarding the entitlement of the tenants, the question which arose was whether the tenants-respondents were entitled to such a conveyance from the landlords without the tenants paying the interest on the amount payable by them on the amount fixed by the principal Court. The Registrar, Court of Small Causes, Madras before whom such matters as provided for under Section 9(3) of the Madras City Tenants' Protection Act, 1921 come up, was of the view that the landlords are bound to execute the conveyance inasmuch as the tenants have complied with the directions issued by the principal Court when it disposed of the petitions under Section 9(1)(b) of the Act.
2. In this case, the principal Court, in the sense, the Court which principally dealt with the relative entitlements of both the landlords and the tenants fixed the price, granted time for payment and thereafter directed that the amounts payable by the tenants were to carry interest at 6 per cent, per annum. Not being satisfied with the quantum fixed as also the period during which the quantified amounts were to be paid by the tenants and also the direction in regard to interest, the tenants and the landlords went un in appeal to the Chief Judge, Court of Small Causes, Madras The appellate Court modified the price and fixed by itself another period for payment of the quantified amount in instalments but remained silent regarding the grant of interest. It is conceded before me that the tenants took up the matter further to this Court in C.R.P. Nos. 1317, 1326 and 1327 of 1971, but the tenants were unsuccessful. The point, however, is that the landlords were satisfied with the order of the Appellate Judge who quantified the just compensation and also indicated the number of monthly instalments during which the tenants had to pay such quantified compensation. Notwithstanding the fact that the Appellate Court did not express itself on the question whether interest was payable at all on such quantified compensation the landlords did not take up the matter further to this Court and the order of the appellate Judge dated 10th August. 1970, become final. After this, petitions were filed by the tenants for a direction to the landlords to convey the extent of the land for which the price was fixed and to put them in possession. It is not in dispute that the other formalities as contemplated under Section 9(3)(a) of the Act were complied with by the tenants. When the petitions for directions were filed by the tenants under Section 9(3)(a) of the Act, an objection was taken by the landlords that they were not obliged to execute the conveyance unless the interest on the qualified compensation was also paid. The contention was that the appellate Court when it passed the order on 10th August, 1970, omitted to grant interest though the principal Court granted the same and such an omission was more or less accidental and could never be said to be intentional. Both the Registrar, Court of Small Causes, and the appellate Court, namely, the Chief Judge of Court of Small Causes, did not agree with this contention. Hence the revision petitions.
3. Learned Counsel for the landlords rightly brought to my notice the three primary conditions which have to be noticed by the principal Court while passing orders on an application by the tenant under Section 9 of the Act. Section 9(1)(b) prescribes three norms which have to be followed by the Court while dealing with an application by the tenant. The fixation of the minimum extent of the land which the landlord should sell to the tenant if he is entitled to the benefits under the Act and while fixing the extent fix the price and after fixing the price, grant a reasonable time to the tenant for payment of such quantified compensation are the prescriptions in the above sub-section. Section 9(1)(b) inter alia says that the Court shall order that within a period to be determined by the Court, not being less than three months and not more than three yean from the date of the order, the tenant shall pay into Court or otherwise as directed the price so fixed in one or more instalments with or without interest. It is no doubt true that the principal Court after having accepted the entitlement of the tenant to the benefits under the Act followed the prescription under Section 9(1)(d) and granted also interest. But in the appeals taken by both the landlords and the tenants against the judgment of the principal Court, the appellate Court did not grant interest. The tenants complied with the decree of the appellate Court in terms stated therein and without paying the interest sought for the conveyance under Section 9(3)(a). What is argued before me is that the omission to grant interest by the appellate Court can only be said to be an accidental omission and cannot be said to be a conclusion after application of the mind of Court. Certainly I agree that the order of the appellate Court could have been more speaking in matter. But at a later stage, when the order has become final in the eye of law, it is not open to either of the parties to challenge the judgment or decree on the ground that there has been an omission, accidental or otherwise in the same. There are methods by which an omission in a judgment or a decree could be corrected. The landlords did have such opportunity at the time when the tenants came up to this Court in C.R.P. Nos. 1317, 1326 and 1327 of 1971 and they could have, sought for an indulgence from this Court at the time at least that a provision for interest should be made or they could have independently taken out on application under a known provision of law for the correction of the alleged omission by the appellate Court. No such step has been taken by the landlords at any time. In these circumstances, the Registrar, Court of Small Causes or the Chief Judge of Court of Small Causes who were called upon to discharge their functions under Section 9(3)(a) cannot go behind the decree of the appellate Court. On a fair and a complete reading of the entire section, it should be understood that what the Court under Section 9(3)(a) is doing is only a function which is equatable to the execution of a final decree. The Court referred to therein, in the instant case is the Registrar, Court of Small Causes as it has been the tradition and practice in that Court, to post such matter before the Registrar. Even otherwise, the Court referred to in Section 9(3)(a) is not a Court independent or different from the principal Court or the Court which exercises appellate jurisdiction over the principal Court. It is in this context it should be stated that the statutory function contemplated in Section 9(3)(a) of the Act is more or less the function of an executing Court, ft is fundamental that an executing Court cannot go behind the decree or judgment of the principal Court. As in this case, the appellate judgment did not provide for interest and as the appellate Court did have jurisdiction either to grant or withhold the grant of such interest and as such a non-grant has not been questioned in a manner known to law, the statutory functionary under Section 9(3)(a) cannot but act in accordance with the terms of the appellate judgment and decree. That is what has been done in this case. Both the Registrar and the Chief Judge, Court of Small Causes were right in saying that the landlords are bound to execute the conveyance without demanding the interest on the quantified compensation.
4. The civil revision petitions, therefore, fail and are dismissed. No costs.