Venkatasubba Rao, J.
1. The plaintiff claims the suit property as his and seeks to recover it from the defendant. The original owner was one Palavesam Asari and the defendant's father was his tenant in respect of the suit property. Palavesam Asari having died, his sisters took possession of his estate and got the defendant's father to execute in their favour Ex. B, dated 23rd September, 1899, which is described as a lease deed. The lease was for three years and, under Section 3 of the Transfer of Property Act, it became determined by efflux of time in the year 1902. After the death of Palavesam Asari's sisters their children executed a deed of sale in favour of the plaintiff.
2. The short question to be decided is, is the suit in time? After the determination of the lease in 1902 no new tenancy was created, because neither the lessor nor his legal representatives assented to the lessee continuing in possession. Under Section 116 of the Transfer of Property Act, if a leasee remains in possession after the determination of the lease and the lessor accepts rent from the lessee or otherwise assents to his continuing in possession, the lease is renewed from year to year or from month to month, according to the purpose for which the property was originally leased. No new tenancy having therefore been created, the Article directly applicable is Article 139 of the Limitation Act. It runs thus : - 'By a landlord to recover possession from a tenant, 12 years, when the tenancy is determined.' The suit was instituted about 16 years after the determination of the tenancy, and therefore, the plaintiff is bound to fail. But it has been argued before me by his learned vakil that Article 139 does not apply to suits brought against the representatives of the original tenant. In Subraveti Ramiah v. Gundala Ramanna (1909) 33 Mad. 260 it was distinctly held that a suit against the representatives of a tenant after the determination of the tenancy to recover the property leased is governed by Article 139 and not by Article 144. An earlier decision in Vedapalli Narasimham v. Dronamraju Seetharamamurthi (1908) 31 Mad. 163 was dissented from by the Bench of the Judges who decided Subraveti Ramiah v. Gundala Ramanna (1909) 33 Mad. 260. I am prepared to follow the later decision as my own view coincides with the view of the learned Judges who decided it. It is unnecessary to state my reasons, because I generally agree with the observations made in Subraveti Ramiah v. Gundala Ramanna (1909) 33 Mad. 260.
3. Turning to the facts of the case, I am clearly of the opinion that the present suit is a purely speculative one. After Palavesam Asari's death, his sisters sold all the property which had belonged to him excepting the suit property. So far as the suit property was concerned, the defendant's father was allowed to remain in possession of it. The defendant deposed that Palavesam Asari borrowed from the defendant's father about Rs. 70 and handed to him the title deeds of the property as security for the repayment of the money. Although Ex. B was taken from the defendant's father by Palavesam Asari's sisters, the understanding appears to have been that the defendants father was to remain in possession of the property practically as the owner of it. The subsequent conduct of the parties confirms this view. No rent was ever paid by the defendant's father nor was any demand for it made. The plaintiff in 1909 persuaded the sons of the sisters of Palavesam Asari to execute a sale deed in his own favour of this property, but from 1909 to 1918 he took no steps to recover it from the defendant. He did not make any demand for rent; he did not take any steps to recover the title-deeds. In my opinion, the plaintiff purchased the property, on the chance of being able to recover it from the defendant knowing full well that he was in reality purchasing litigation.
4. The Second Appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.