P.V. Rajamannar, C.J.
1. This arises out of an application by the State of Madras filed under Section 4(2)(b) of Madras Act (XXX of 1956) to set aside the decision of the Estates Abolition Tribunal, Vellore, in A.S. No. 79 of 1956 from the decision of the Settlement Officer, No. IV Tiruchirapalli, dated 15th November, 1950. The order of the Estates Abolition Tribunal was passed on 15th September, 1956. Madras Act (XXX of 1956) came into force on 3rd August, 1957. The application by the State was filed on 6th August, 1958. Section 4(1) which confers the right on the Government to file an application to set aside the decision of the Settlement Officer or the Tribunal constituted under the Abolition Act prescribes a period of one year from the date the Act, that is, Act XXX of 1956, came into force. Such an application, if preferred against the decision of a Settlement Officer, lies to the appropriate Tribunal, and in other cases to the Special Appellate Tribunal constituted under Section 7. Section 4(2)(b) provides that such an application shall be dealt with as an appeal under the said section, that is Section 7. Section 7 deals with appeals to the Special Appellate Tribunal from the decision of a Tribunal appointed under Act XXX of 1956. Obviously what is contemplated under Section 4(2)(b) of the Act is that appeals to the Special Appellate Tribunal against Tribunals constituted under the, Abolition Act will also be dealt with on the same footing as appeals against tribunals appointed under Madras Act XXX of 1956, and the same procedure would govern the disposal of the applications filed under Section 4 of Act XXX of 1956.
2. The present application by the State has been filed beyond the prescribed time. There has been a delay of three days. Admittedly there is no specific provision in Madras Act XXX of 1956 itself which confers jurisdiction on the Special Appellate Tribunal to condone any delay in filing the application under Section 4 of the Act. Undoubtedly the Special Appellate Tribunal as such has no inherent jurisdiction to excuse the delay in filing an application to it. The learned Government Pleader had therefore perforce to rely on Section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act. That section runs thus:
Any appeal or application for review of judgment or for leave to appeal or any other application to which this section may be made applicable by or under any enactment for the time being in force may be admitted after the period of limitation prescribed therefore when the appellant or applicant satisfies the Court that he had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal or making the application within such period.
The Explanation to this section is not material. Now the present application under Section 4 of Madras Act XXX of 1956 is not an appeal or application for review of judgment for leave to appeal within the meaning of those expressions in Section 5 of the Limitation Act. They are appeals and applications which are governed by the entries in the First Schedule to the Limitation Act and which are based on the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure. There is one other category covered by Section 5, namely 'any other application to which this section may be made applicable by or under any enactment for the time being in force'. Madras Act XXX of 1956 does not make Section 5 of the Limitation Act applicable to applications under Section 4 of that Act. It follows that the present application does not fall within any of the categories mentioned in Section 9 of the Limitation Act and, therefore, the provisions of that section cannot be invoked to save the application from the bar of time. We hold that the Special Appellate Tribunal has no power to condone the delay in filing the application. Hence the application is dismissed. No costs.