K. Veeraswami, J.
1. Our judgment in the second appeal was no doubt a reversing one; but, all the same, we are not satisfied that this is a fit case for grant of leave under Article 133 (1) (a) or (c) of the Constitution. Ramakrishnan, J., considered when the second appeal was posted before him in the first instance, that the value of the appeal to the appellant who is the respondent in the leave petition, would be Rs. 20,000 or more. The learned Judge was of that view having regard to the value of the property owned by the respondent and the detriment that he would suffer by the imposition of the easement claimed by the petitioner who was the plaintiff. It was on that view of the valuation, he directed that the second appeal should be heard by a Division Bench. We do not think that, for the purpose of these petitions, the valuation so fixed by the learned Judge can be taken into account. Article 133 (1) (a) speaks of the amount or value of the subject-matter of the dispute in the Court of the first instance and still in dispute on appeal, and it is clear, therefore, that it is the value to the appellant that will govern. There are no materials before us with reference to which we can say that the value of the detriment suffered by the petitioner, who was but a tenant, was anywhere near Rs. 20,000. He himself valued the relief in the plaint for purposes of Court-fee and jurisdiction only at Rs. 400. As a matter of fact, the petitioner is only a statutory tenant entitled to the statutory protection from eviction. It is the value of the detriment to be suffered by him in such circumstances and in that capacity that should be the basis for considering whether leave could be granted under Article 133 (1) (a).
2. We think that the point has been precisely put by the Privy Council in Meghji Lakhamshi & Bros. v. Furniture Workshop L.R. (1954) A.C. 80 : (1954) 2 W.L.R. 159 : (1954) 1 All E.R. 273. That was a dispute between a landlord and a tenant, and the method of valuation of the subject-matter of dispute from the stand point of the appellants was indicated by the Board in this manner.
Their Lordship have no doubt that under whichever limb of the article any case may fall, the 'value' must be looked at from the point of view of the appellant, with the result that an appeal may sometimes lie where the landlord is the appellant although there could be no appeal by the tenant, or vice versa.
3. We may observe that the value for purposes of Article 133 (1) (a) is not approached from the stand point of jurisdiction; but from the point of view of what the value of the subject-matter of the dispute was in the Court of first instance and is to the appellant in the proposed appeal to 'the Supreme Court. The principle of the English decision finds illustration in Abdulkhudus v. Abdul Gani : AIR1940Mad955 .
4. It is contended for the petitioner that the value given by the appellant in the second appeal should govern the value for purposes of these leave petitions. We are of opinion that this contention cannot be accepted. Surely the value of the detriment suffered by the owner of the property by the imposition of the easementary right over it cannot be the same as that gained or suffered by a tenant of the dominant tenement. We cannot value the determent of the petitioner on the basis of what he might lose in his business for no one knows what it is and that had nothing to do with the subject-matter in dispute at all stages.
5. On that view, therefore, we are not satisfied that the subject-matter in dispute in the appeal is of the value of Rs. 20,000 or more. We are inclined to think that it should be far less, considering the fact that the petitioner is but a statutory tenant and not even the owner of the dominant tenement.
6. It is then contended for the petitioner that at least he should be granted leave-under Article 133 (1) (c). No doubt, we mentioned in our judgment in the second appeal that a question of law did arise. But we also indicated clearly that the question of law that arose related to the effect to be given to the proved facts. That in our opinion, having regard to all the circumstances, though may be a question of law, is not a substantial question of law to warrant grant of leave to the Supreme-Court.
7. We decline leave and dismiss the petitions. No costs.