1. This is an application to revise the order of the learned District Judge of Madura dismissing a petition by a minor who attained majority. Under Section 34 (c) and (d), Guardian and Wards Act, the petitioner asks for a proper scrutiny of the accounts submitted by the guardian or ex-guardian. I use this expression because the order made by the previous District Judge was that the guardian would be discharged subject to his furnishing proper accounts. The guardian has since submitted his accounts and the District Judge does not say they are improper.
2. The learned District Judge regards the case in Nabu Bepari v. Shek Mahomed 5 C. W. N. 207 as a direct authority in support of the objection taken on behalf of the guardian that no such order can be made under Section 34 when once the ward has attained majority. The learned vakil for the petitioner points to Govindabatta v. Narayanabatta  29 Mad. 424 as an authority of this Court as directly contrary to Nabu Bepari v. Sheikh Mohamed 5 C. W. N. 207 but all that the former decides is that they cannot follow the decision of the Calcutta High Court as to the effect of the termination of the guardianship on the powers of the Court under the sections quoted, that is to say, the provisions of Sections 41 (3) and 45 (1) (c). These sections relate to failure to deliver property or accounts. The law has been exhaustively considered quite recently in the case reported in Subbarami Reddi v. Pattabhirami Reddi A. I. R. 1926 Mad. 977 by a Bench of this Court. The learned Judges recognized in their judgment that where a guardian has been finally discharged the Court can act under Section 41 (3) and they held that it is contrary to the intention of the Act that a detailed scrutiny of accounts should be held in order to ascertain what amount is really due by the guardian. The learned Judges held that the Act leaves all these questions for decision by a suit outside guardianship proceedings. The decision in Seetharam v. Mt. Govindee A. I. R. 1924 All. 593 is to the contrary effect, namely, that under the Act the Court can hold an enquiry as to the correctness of the accounts, that is to say, that the Court should not accept any accounts that may be put before it by the guardian; but that authority has been expressly dissented from in the judgment I have just referred to and that judgment is of course binding on me. In a somewhat similar case in Hari Krishna Chettiar v. Govindarajulu Naicker A. I. R. 1926 Mad. 478 where the Court ordered a guardian to deposit in Court a sum found due from him, it was held that the order was one passed under Section 43 (1) and not under Section 34 (d), and the Court was of opinion, when the measure of the guardian's liability is sought to be put in issue, the proper course is to apply to the Court under Section 35 or Section 36 and then file a regular suit against the guardian.
3. I am then asked to reduce the ambit of this petition to .one for simply ordering the guardian to pay into Court the amount shown to be due in his account. This petition does not ask for that relief. There is no limitation in these matters. It is of course open to the petitioner to put in a petition for this purpose hereafter. I do not think any good reason has been shown why I should reduce the ambit of this petition in the present case. The order therefore of the learned District Judge was right and the revision petition must be dismissed with costs.