1. The petitioner was a dealer in coffee, tea, etc. He was assessed by the Deputy Commercial Tax Officer, Srivaikuntam at Tuticorin, for the year 1957-58 on a net turnover of Rs. 16,24,177, assessable to tax at various rates. This turnover included a turnover of Rs. 7,56,861-59 nP. which was in respect of sales of pure coffee powder. The contention of the petitioner before the Tribunal was that coffee powder is not included in the term ' Coffee' under Section 5 (v) of the Act. The only question is whether the term ' Coffee ' includes coffee powder.
2. It is not necessary to refer to the definition of ' Coffee ' in other enactments. It is open to the Legislature to define any expression as it likes in order to suit the object and purpose of the particular enactment. There is no indication, express or implied, in the Madras General Sales Tax Act of the Legislature, intending to confine the expression ' Coffee ' only to coffee seeds, and not to apply it to coffee powder. Learned Counsel for the petitioner contended that coffee powder is something different from coffee seeds and relied upon the decision in Cotton v. Vegan and Co. L.R. (1896) A.C. 457, where the term ' grain ' used in a particular enactment was held not to include the powdered form of the grain. Section 2 of the Metage on Grain (Port of London) Act, 1872, defined grain as meaning '' corn, pulse and seeds ' . It was quite clear under the terms of that enactment that powder or flour from the grain could not be grain as defined by that statute. We are of opinion that that decision cannot help the petitioner to substantitate his contention that the term '' coffee ' under the Madras General Sales Tax Act will not include coffee powder.
3. Our attention was drawn to the definition of coffee under the 1959 Act, which is as follows:
Coffee, that is to say, any one of the forms of coffee, such as coffee beans, coffee seeds (raw or roasted), coffee powder, but not including coffee drink.
The comprehensive definition of coffee contained in the 1959 Act is no indication that the term ' Coffee ' used in the previous enactment should have a restricted meaning. It may be that by way of abundant caution, the Legislature thought fit to define the term ' Coffee ' expansively so as to obviate any contention that coffee powder is not coffee within the meaning of the Act. We are of opinion that the petitioner's turnover in respect of coffee powder in the sum of Rs. 7,56,861-59 nP. was properly included.
4. The petition fails and is dismissed with costs. Counsel's fee Rs. 100.