1. The preliminary objection is taken that this revision petition under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure is not sustainable, as it raises no question of jurisdiction. The Full Bench of the Presidency Small Cause Court dismissed the application of the present petitioners (defendants in the suit) for a new trial, on the ground that the application was barred by limitation, and it is this judgment of the Full Bench which is now sought to be revised.
2. Though the petition for revision attacks the decision of the Full Bench upon the question of limitation as erroneous in law on various grounds, it nowhere raises any question of jurisdiction in that connection. The only paragraph of the revision petition which raises any question of jurisdiction (viz., No. 8) refers to other matters than that of limitation. Apart from this the cases Sundar Singh v. Doru Shankar 20 A. 78 : A.W.N. (1898) 168 and Ram-gopal Jhoonjhoonwalla v. Joharmall Khemka 15 Ind. Cas. 547 : 39 C. 473, cited by the respondent's Vakil, are authority for the position that an erroneous decision on a question of limitation by a Court having power to decide that question does not justify interference under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. For the petitioners the case of Naraya Hegde v. Vitla Prabhu 12 Ind. Cas. 75 : 21 M.L.J. 1020 : (1911) M.W.N. 239 : 10 M.L.T. 281 is referred to. That case, however, does not purport to deal with the question decided in the Allahabad and Calcutta cases above mentioned, nor to lay down any proposition of law opposed to the conclusion arrived at by them. It does not appear to have been intended even to lay down the general proposition which appears in the head-note. As I understand the facts of the case, there was more than a mere terror in deciding a question of limitation. The initial error was a misconstruction of Section 48 of the Code, the construction placed thereupon by the lower Court being found to be opposed to a long series of decisions. I, therefore, follow the Allahabad and Calcutta cases cited above, both of which rely upon the decision of the Privy Council in Amir Hassan Khan v. Sheo Baksh Singh 11 C. 6 : 11 I.A. 237 : 4 Sar. P.C.J. 359 : Rafique and Jackson's P.C. No. 83, and hold that I have no power under Section 115 of the Code, of Civil Procedure to revise the decision of the Full Bench of the Presidency Small Cause Court on the question of limitation merely because it is alleged to be erroneous.
3. The petitioners then urge, upon the strength of the Full Bench ruling in Krist-amma Naidu v. Chapa Naidu 17 M. 410, that the Full Bench of the Presidency Small Cause Court may be said to have acted in the exercise of its jurisdiction illegally or with material irregularity inasmuch as the decision on the question of limitation is perverse in the sense that it involves a conscious departure from some rule of law or procedure. The decision turned upon the question whether the starting point of limitation for the purposes of the application to the Full Bench was the date of the original decree or the date of an amendment thereof relating to posts only. The original decree was dated the 30th September 1912 and the amendment was made on the 19th December 1912. The period for making an application under Section 38 of the Presidency Small Cause Courts Act is eight days. The application in this case was one on the merits of the case and had no reference at all to the amendment as to costs. The Court, relying on Order XX, Rule 7, of the Code of Civil Procedure, and the decision in Brojo Lal Rai Chowdhury v. Tata Prasanna Bhattacharji 3 Cri.L.J. 188 and Parameshraya, v. Seshagiriappa 22 M. 364, held that limitation began to run from the date of the original decree and declined to adopt the suggestion that the decision in Venkata. Jogayya v. Verikatasimhadri Jagapatirazu 24 M. 25 should be applied and that the amendment should be treated as virtually an application for review of judgment, on the ground that the case cited referred to execution of decrees, and that the Court has no powers of review. I can find nothing here to support, the contention that there was any conscious departure from any rule of law or procedure such as to justify interference under Section 115, Civil Procedure Code,
4. The petition is, therefore, dismissed with costs.