1. The appellant is the Cooperative Credit Society of Arungunam. It obtained an award under the provisions of the Co-operative Societies Act against the respondent for a sum of money. The award was made on February 30, 1928. The application to enforce the award was made by the Registrar of Cooperative Societies to the Court on January 15, 1932. The only question in this appeal is whether the application is time barred. Admittedly it is, if Article 181 of the Limitation Act governs it. But the argument is that the application not being one under the Civil Procedure Code, the Limitation Act has no application. The application to enforce the award was made in accordance with the procedure laid down by Rule 14(5) of the Statutory Rules which have been framed under the Co-operative Societies Act. The particular course taken by the Registrar in the present case was under Rule 14(5)(b), which says:
On application to the Civil Court having jurisdiction over the subject matter of the decision or award that Court shall enforce the decision on award as if it were a decree of the Court.
2. It is clear that the application is made to the Court to exercise its functions as a Court. But the argument is that admitting that the application is made to the Court, it is not an application made to the Court under the Civil Procedure Code, but is an application made under the provisions of the Co-operative Societies Article. There is no doubt upon the case law that Article 181 of the Limitation Act only relates to applications under the Code. But if these cases are examined, (they?) refer to applications to the Court to order something which the Court has no power to order or to do under the Civil Procedure Code, e.g., an application for probate to the court under the Probate and Administration Act- Bai Manekbai v. Manekji Kavesji 7 B 213 or for an order under the special rules of the High Court for recovery of costs by a Solicitor Wadia Gandhy & Co. v. Purushotam 32 B 1 or an application by a Liquidator under Section 186 of the Indian Companies Act for an order upon contributories of the Company to pay debts, Hansraj v. Official Liquidator of the Dehra-Dun-Mossoori Electric Tramway Co. Ltd. 64 M.L.J. 403 : 142 Ind. Cas. 7 : Ind. Rul. (1933)P.C. 43 : (1933) M.W.N. 190 : A.I.R. 1900 P.C. 63 : (1933) A.L.J. 175 : 35 Bom. L.R. 319 : 37 L.W. 445 : 64 M.L.J. 403 : 37 C.W.N. 379 : 57 C.W.J. 166 : 54 A. 1067 (P.C.) In each of these instances the remedy given by a particular Act is enforceable in the manner provided by this and not by the machinery of the civil procedure Code. In the present case the application is to the Court to exercise, its execution jurisdiction as if the award was a decree. I think that means that it is to be executed in the same manner as decrees are executed under the Code. In fact, a Court has no other power than that which is conferred upon it by the Code to put its execution machinery in motion. In my judgment this case is hardly distinguishable from, Sambasiva Mudaliar v. Panchanada. palli 31 M 24. There an application was made in pursuance of Section 40 of the Revenue Recovery Act which provides that on production of a sale certificate by the purchaser, the Court shall cause a proper process to be issued for the purpose of putting such purchaser in possession in the same manner as if the purchased lands had been decreed to him by a decree of the Court. The same argument was raised there as here that the application was not one made under the Civil Procedure Code. But it was held that inasmuch as the application to the Court was to put in motion the machinery of the Code, it was an application under the Code. This reasoning seems to be decisive of, the present appeal. The appeal accordingly fails and is dismissed with costs.