Coutts Trotter, J
1. In this case the print was argued at length that the eviction was bad and therefore, was not a proceeding under the Act, because it was carried out by the Tahsildar instead of the Collector. Mr. Krishnaawami Aiyangar at the end of the case pointed out that when the facts were looked in to, the eviction was clearly carried out under the written order of the Collector and the whole substructure on which this argument was founded fell to the ground.
2. A further point was taken that as the suit was for the recovery of real property, it was not a proceeding under the Act but was a proceeding under the general law, and reliance was placed upon two decisions of this Court on a section of another Act, which was said to be so analogous in its language as to give guidance in determining the meaning of this section in this Act. The section in question was the old Section 156 of the Madras Local Boards Act of 1884. One of the cases is President of the Tuluq Board, Sivaganga v. Narayanan 16 M.K 317 and the other is Syed Ameer Sahib v. Venkatarama 16 M.S 296. To my mind the learned Judges in the latter case, Muthuswami Aiyar and Wilkinson, JJ., pointed out the true distinction between these sections when they said that the old Section 156 was only applicable to suits for compensation claimed for wrongful acts committed under the colour of the Act; in other words, it was a section giving the person affected remedies against the officers who misused their powers under the Act to the detriment of individuals. I do not think that reasoning can apply to this section, which is in the very' widest terms and gives a remedy to any person who deems himself aggrieved by any proceeding under the Act. I, therefore, think this is a proceeding under the Act and that the period of limitation applicable is the shorter period provided by the Act itself and not the period of limitation under the general law.
Sesagiri Aiyar, J.
3. I agree. The language of Section 14 of Madras Act 111 of 1905 makes it clear that it was intended to give the party all rights of action against any proceeding taken under the Act; that is, not only can the aggrieved party sue for damages in respect of unlawful proceedings under the Act, but also for a declaration of his right to property or for the recovery of property. The language of the sections to which Mr. Ramachandra Aiyar has drawn our attention shows that they were all intended to give the party a personal remedy in tort for damages against persons who unlawfully used the powers given under the Acts. The cases on the language of those sections have no bearing on the language of the present section I. therefore, agree that the second appeal should be dismissed with costs.