1. The question in this case is whether the plaintiff's suit is barred by limitation. The suit has been treated as one for rent. The plaintiff instituted the suit at first in the District Munsif's Court of Gudivada on the regular side and it was returned to the plaintiff for presentation to the proper Court on the ground that the suit was one cognizable by a Small Cause Court. The plaintiff did not accept the view taken by the Munsif on the question of jurisdiction, but appealed against it to the District Court, and, on that Court confirming the Munsif's view, he put in a revision petition under Section 622 of the repealed Civil Procedure Code to the High Court. The High Court refused to interfere on the ground that there was no question of jurisdiction involved in the petition. If the period occupied by the plaintiff in prosecuting his suit, appeal and revision petition in the Munsif's Court, the District Court and the High Court respectively, be deducted in computing the period of limitation, this suit would admittedly be within time. The Subordinate Judge and the learned Judge of this Court, before whom the civil revision petition came on for hearing, have both held that, although the time taken up by the suit and the appeal should be deducted, the period during which plaintiff was prosecuting his civil revision petition in the High Court could not be deducted. After giving our best consideration to the case we are unable to agree with the view taken by Ayling, J. The wording of Section 14 runs thus:
2. 'In computing the period of limitation prescribed for any suit, the time during which the plaintiff has been prosecuting, with due diligence, another civil proceeding whether in a Court of first instance or in a Court of Appeal against the defendant, shall be excluded.' The exclusion, according to the section, relates to the time during which, the plaintiff has been prosecuting 'another civil proceeding in a Court of Appeal.' The language of the Legislature is not that the time occupied in prosecuting an 'appeal' may be deducted, but the time occupied in prosecuting any 'civil proceeding in a Court of Appeal. We see no reason why a revision petition in the High Court should not be regarded as a 'Civil proceeding in a Court, of Appeal.' We think that the expression 'Court of Appeal' should be taken as being used in the broad sense of any Court which has the power to bring under review the decision of an inferior Court, whatever may be the extent of jurisdiction that the superior Court may possess in reviewing the decision of the inferior Court. There is no reason for supposing that the mischief of the statute does not extend to cases where the plaintiff was bona fide prosecuting a civil revision petition instead of an appeal. See the explanation of the term 'appeal' in Chappan v. Moidin Kutti 22 M.k 68. Mr. Prakasam has relied on Subramania Pillai v. Seethai Ammal (1911) 2 M.W.N. 198. There, the question was whether a revision petition could be regarded as an appeal within the meaning of Article 182 of the Limitation Act. The third column of the Article deals separately with an appeal, a review and an application for amendment. It may be that a petition for revision would not be included within the meaning of the word 'appeal' in that clause; but we do not think that that decision shows that the expression 'Court of Appeal' in Section 14 would exclude a Court of Revision. We have already referred to the fact that what is spoken of in Section 14 is not an appeal' but 'any judicial proceeding in a Court of Appeal.' Our view would seem to be in accordance with that which was taken by the Allahabad High Court in Seth Mulchand v. Seth Samir Mal (1882) A.W.N. 59 but we have not been able to see that case. There is no reason for holding in this case that the revision petition was not prosecuted in good faith. The plaintiff's mere discontent with the opinions of two Courts is not a reason for believing that he did not prosecute his revision petition in good faith. We must, therefore, hold that the suit is not barred by limitation. We set aside the order of Ayling, J., and the decree of the Subordinate Judge and remand the suit to the Court of the Subordinate Judge for disposal on the merits according to law. The costs in this Court in this appeal and the petition before Ayling, J., will abide the result.