Sadasiva Aiyar, J.
1. I am satisfied from a perusal' of Exhibit A that the contract between the parties was, that to discharge the loan of 30,000 burnt tiles made to the defendants by the plaintiff in May 1905, the same number of properly-burnt tiles (not the identical 30,000 tiles after they had been, as intended, used by the 1st defendant and the father of defendants Nos. 2 to 4 in covering the temple roof, but the same number of burnt tiles) should be returned to the plaintiff on demand after 20th January 1906 and if the tiles offered in satisfaction are not approved by the plaintiff and his four panchayatdars the identical tiles lent, though they had been used in covering the temple roof, should be brought down from that roof and returned to the plaintiff. I think this contract was broken when the defendants failed to offer to deliver thirty thousand properly-burnt tiles on the 21st January 1906, the plaintiff's right to make a demand on the defendants for satisfaction of his claim under Exhibit A having arisen on the said 21st January 1906. That an actual demand is not necessary to establish a starting point under Article 132 of the Limitation Act, even though the document makes the money payable ' on demand,' has been established by the decisions of this Court. See Perumal Ayyan v. Alagirisami Bhagavathar 7 M.L.J. 222 and Perianna Gounden v. Muthuvira Gounden 7 M.L.J. 315.
2. As is said in Perumal Ayyan v. Alagirisami Bhagavathar 7 M.L.J. 222, 'on demand' is a technical expression meaning immediately or forthwith.' I cannot admit the petitioner's learned Vakil's contention that Article 49 applies to this suit brought, for damages for breach of contract (based on a contract of loan of tiles), this suit not being a suit in tort for the wrongful taking, injuring or wrongful detention of specific moveable property or for the recovery of specific moveables.
3. Article 115 seems to me to clearly apply to this case, and not Aricle 120 (which was relied on by Mr. Chenchiah for the respondents and which is a much more general Article than 115 and which should be relied on only in the last resort). The suit was clearly barred when it was brought in 1913, and this revision petition is, therefore, dismissed with costs.