Venkatasubba Rao, J.
1. The first defendant was a dissolute young man. His relations, finding that he was wasting his property, got him to execute the deed, dated the 17th July, 1919. It deals with seven, items of immovable property and is described as a deed of settlement. The question to be decided in this appeal is, what is the true construction of this instrument? In my opinion it creates a joint interest in the 1st defendant, his mother and his wife, for their lives, with a remainder in favour of the 1st defendant's heirs. The words are these:
Myself, my mother and wife shall jointly enjoy the under mentioned properties. No alienation by one of us singly shall be valid. If an alienation is to be made, it shall be done by us three together, and if it is made without the consent of all the three, it shall not be, valid. My heirs shall enjoy absolutely after our life-time.
2. I cannot construe the words 'my heirs' as words of limitation. The heirs are intended to take as grantees and in my opinion, there is a remainder given under the instrument to the heirs of the 1st defendant. The document is not very happily worded and although there is a recital that one of the objects of getting this document executed was to provide for the debts binding upon the 1st defendant, there is in fact no clause, which-deals with the debts mentioned at the foot of the document. But I do not think it is necessary to pursue this matter further.
3. Two months after the execution of this deed of settlement, the 1st defendant purported to sell to the plaintiffs one of the seven items comprised in it. The lower Court has held that the plaintiff purchased the property, with the knowledge of the previous document and with the object of rendering its provisions ineffective. But the point that has to be determined is this, if the 1st defendant had only an interest conjointly along with his mother and his wife, in all the seven items of property, specified in the deed of settlement, can he convey any interest to the plaintiff, in one specific item, out of the seven items, in virtue of the sale-deed, executed in favour of the plaintiff? I am clearly of the opinion, that the plaintiff cannot claim that he has become the purchaser of the specific item conveyed to him. It has been contended by the learned vakil for the appellant that it may be open to the plaintiff, to file a suit for partition against the mother and the wife of the 1st defendant and urge that, as a matter of equity, the specific item of property, with which we are concerned, should be allotted to the share of the 1st defendant. It is not necessary to decide this question, for the disposal of this Appeal. Another question, which has been raised, is whether the restraint upon alienation is such as falls within Section 10 of the Transfer of Property Act. In my opinion, it is not necessary to decide this question either. I propose to say nothing in regard to what the plaintiff may be able to urge, if he files a suit for partition. In the view I have taken, that the 1st defendant is not competent to transfer one specific item of the seven items of the property, the second appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.